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Abstract
Unemployment in the big continental European economies like France and Germany
has been substantially increasing since the mid 1970s. So far it has been di¢ cult
to empirically explain the increase in unemployment in these countries via changes
in supposedly employment unfriendly institutions like the generosity and duration of
unemployment benets. At the same time, there is some evidence produced by Ball
(1996, 1999) saying that tight monetary policy during the disinations of the 1980s
caused a subsequent increase in the NAIRU, and that there is a relationship between
the increase in the NAIRU and the size of the disination during that period across
advanced OECD economies. There is also mounting evidence suggesting a role of the
slowdown in productivity growth, e.g. Nickell et al. (2005), IMF (2003), Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000).
This paper introduces endogenous growth into an otherwise standard New Key-
nesian model with capital accumulation and unemployment. We subject the model
to a cost push shock lasting for 1 quarter, in order to mimic a scenario akin to the
one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s. Monetary policy implements a
disination by following a standard interest feedback rule calibrated to an estimate
of a Bundesbank reaction function. About 40 quarters after the shock has vanished,
unemployment is still about 1.7 percentage points above its steady state, while an-
nual productivity growth has decreased. Over a similar horizon, a higher weight on
the output gap increases employment (i.e. reduces the fall in employment below its
steady state). Thus the model generates an increase in unemployment following a
disination without relying on a change to labour market structure.
We are also able to coarsely reproduce cross country di¤erences in unemployment.
A higher disination generated by a larger cost push shock causes a stronger persistent
increase in unemployment, the correlation noted by Ball. For a given cost push shock,
a policy rule estimated for the Bundesbank produces stronger persistent increase
in unemployment than a policy rule estimated for the Federal Reserve. Testable
di¤erences in real wage rigidity between continental Europe and the United States,
namely, as pointed out by Blanchard and Katz (1999), the presence of the labour
share in the wage setting function for Europe with a negative coe¢ cient but its
absence in the U.S. also imply di¤erent unemployment outcomes following a cost
push shock: If the real wage does not depend on the labour share, the persistent
increase in unemployment is about one percentage point smaller than in its presence.
To the extent that the wage setting structure is due to labour market rigidities,
"Shocks and Institutions" jointly determine the unemployment outcome, as suggested
by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
The calibration of unobservable model parameters is guided by a comparison of
second moments of key variables of the model with western German data. The endoge-
nous growth model matches the moments better than a model without endogenous
growth but otherwise identical features. This is particularly true for the persistence
in employment as measured by rst and higher order autocorrelation coe¢ cients.
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1 Introduction
"Short-run macroeconomics and long-run growth theory have never
been properly integrated. It is only a slight caricature to say that once
upon a time the long run was treated casually as forward extension of
the short run, whereas nowadays the tendency is to treat the short run
casually as a backward extension of the long-run."
Robert M. Solow/Athanasios Orphanides (1990).1
One of the most widespread beliefs in mainstream macroeconomic theory is the
separation of short- and long run analysis. While aggregate demand may cause
temporary output uctuations, output ultimately returns to potential as prices ad-
just. What is more, potential output itself and the "non-accelerating-ination-rate-
of-unemployment" (NAIRU) are not a¤ected. Accordingly, unemployment depends
only on the institutions a¤ecting the wage setting power of employees and the price
setting power of rms, like the duration and generosity of unemployment benets,
union membership or product market competition. By contrast, monetary policy has
only a short run e¤ect on unemployment.
Labour market economists have applied this framework to the steady rise in conti-
nental European unemployment since the 1970s. They tried to estimate the e¤ects of
changes in labour market institutions. The results have not been entirely conclusive.
At the outset, labour economist where encouraged by the fact that labour market
rigidities seem to be able to explain why unemployment is so much lower in the exi-
ble labour market of the United States, than in Europe. However, as it comes to the
evolution of European unemployment over time, Blanchard notes that explanations
based solely on institutions also run into a major empirical problem: Many of these
institutions where already present when unemployment was low, and, while many
became more employment-unfriendly in the 1970s, the movement since then has been
largely in the opposite direction.2
At the same time, Ball (1996, 1999) has produced evidence which links part of
the increase in the NAIRU to a desire to disinate the economy and more hawkish
conduct of monetary policy in Europe as opposed to the United States. Furthermore,
in many countries, the increase in the NAIRU has been accompanied by a substantial
slowdown in productivity growth. Early on Bruno and Sachs (1982) and more recently
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Fitoussi et. al. (2000), the IMF (2003) and Nickel et.
al.(2005) have produced evidence for a statistically signicant relationship between
the two.
1Solow/ Orphanides (1990), p. 258.
2Blanchard/ Wolfers (2000), p. C2. He recently somewhat qualied that statement by suggest-
ing the problem might not lie with the story but with the crude measurement of labour market
institutions, see Blanchard (2005), p. 417. This is by now means a new idea and does not materially
change the problems the empirical literature on labour market institutions and unemployment has
run into.
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As an exception among macroeconomists, Blanchard (2000, 1998) suggested a role
for monetary policy, arguing that the implementation of high real interest rates by
European central banks in the 1980s in order to reduce ination required the marginal
product of capital to increase. The subsequent decline of the capital labour ratio
would reduce the marginal product of labour. If real wages are rigid, unemployment
has to rise to implement the corresponding decline in real wages.3 However, while
long-term real interest rates indeed did rise in the 1980s, they have declined in the
second half of the 1990s. They are now at about the level they had been at the end
of the 60s, while unemployment in the big European economies remains stubbornly
high.
This paper contributes to the explanation of this evidence -the rise in the NAIRU,
the slowdown in productivity growth and Balls evidence on the impact of disina-
tions on the NAIRU- by introducing endogenous growth into a New Keynesian model
featuring unemployment. We implement this in a very simple fashion by assuming
that technological progress is realised through investment and thus linking total factor
productivity to the capital stock. We subject the economy to a 1 quarter temporary
cost-push shock and let the central bank disinate - as happened in many industri-
alised economies at the beginning of the 1980s. It turns out the employment e¤ects
can indeed be quite persistent and that unemployment might remain below its steady
state value by more than 1 percentage point for more than 10 years, associated with
stable ination: the NAIRU increases. A fall in the productivity growth rate caused
by a fall in investment depresses the real wage growth rate consistent with stable
ination, which, with real wage growth being rigid, requires higher unemployment.
Our results resemble those of Sargent and Ljungqvist in that the model proposed
here generates an increase in unemployment without relying on changes in labour
market rigidity, while the "level" of labour market rigidity does matter.4 However,
their approach di¤ers from ours in that in their model, unemployment increase via the
interaction of an unemployment insurance paying benets linked to past income and
a permanent increase in "microeconomic turbulence". "Microeconomic turbulence"
is the probability that a worker looses his human capital in case his job is exogenously
destroyed. The increase in turbulence creates a fraction of unemployed workers who
enjoy high benets (because they used to be high skilled) but are now low skilled
and thus have a low earnings potential on the labour market. Therefore they have
little incentive to engage in (costly) job search, which reduces their probability of
regaining employment. By contrast, our approach is a macroeconomic one in that
the driving force pushing up unemployment is an inationary shock and the response
of the central bank to this shock.
The paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 to 4 are some brief discussions
of the evidence highlighted above, namely on the role of labour market institutions
(section 2), the role of productivity growth (section 3) and monetary policy (section
3See Blanchard (1998), pp. 5-18 and Blanchard (2000), pp. 2-15, and also Bean (1997), p. 95.
4See Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998) and (2007).
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4) in explaining unemployment. Section 5 develops a model which coarsely encom-
passes the mainstream consensus on the relationship between monetary policy and
unemployment sketched above, which we coin "Jackman, Layard, Nickell", or JLN
economy, and then add the New Growth extension whose consequences we want to
investigate in this paper. Section 6 discusses the calibration, which is informed by
empirical evidence on some of the model parameters and by the comparison of the
second moments of a couple of model variables with their empirical counterparts in
German data, while Section 7 presents a more complete moment comparison. Sec-
tion 8 then discusses the response to the economy of a one quarter cost push shock
calibrated to induce a disination of about 4 percentage points. We also conduct a
couple of robustness experiments in that section: We vary the output gap coe¢ cient
in the central banks reaction function and summarise the trade-o¤ which policymak-
ers face by computing medium run average unemployment rates and NAIRUs and
the resulting Phillips Curves are downwards sloping. Furthermore, we check the ro-
bustness of our results against changes in real wage rigidity and the slope of capital
stock adjustment costs. While section 8 thus aims at establishing that our model can
produce a persistent increase increase in unemployment following a one quarter cost
push shock, section 9 aims to add a cross country dimension to our analysis in three
di¤erent ways. First, we vary the size of the cost push shock and record the result-
ing changes in Ination and the NAIRU over 10 year horizon, then we compare the
di¤erences in the unemployment response generated by Bundesbank and a Federal
Reserve Policy rule as estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), and thirdly we
investigate the e¤ects di¤erences in real wage rigidity between Europe and the United
States. Section 9 concludes.
2 Tests of the Institutional Approach
There have been various attempts to provide evidence for the institutional hypothe-
ses. Most often these attempts consist of regressing unemployment on (indicators of)
the institutional variables like the duration and generosity of unemployment benets,
employment protection. This approach runs into problems when trying to explain
the dynamics of unemployment. A recent IMF (2003) study over a period from 1965
to 1998 concluded that institutions "hardly account for the growing trend observed
in most European countries and the dramatic fall in U.S. unemployment in the 90s":
The part of the unemployment rate not explained by institutions increases over time.5
Similarly, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) noted that "while labour market institutions
can possibly explain cross country di¤erences today, they do not appear to able to
explain the general evolution of unemployment over time."6 Furthermore, it turns
out that institutions are especially weak in explaining the evolution of unemploy-
5IMF (2003), p. 134.
6See Blanchard/ Wolfers (2000), p. C2.
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ment in Germany and France, which are most often cited as examples of "sclerotic"
economies.7
A study by Nickell (2002, 2005) covering about the same time period reveals
similar problems in that institutions explain virtually nothing for Western Germany
and Finland and only a minor part of the unemployment increase in Spain and New
Zealand. Substantial movements of unemployment are left unexplained for Ireland,
France, the UK and Italy.8 The explanatory power of both the Nickell et al and
the IMF regressions rely on including lagged unemployment in the regression, with
coe¢ cients of 0.79 (IMF) and 0.87 (Nickell et al) respectively. In the words of Nickell
et al,: "This reects a high level of persistence and/or the inability of the included
variables to explain what is going on."9 A study by Elmeskov et al. (1998) conrms
this impression. They ask how much of the change in structural rather than actual
unemployment is accounted for by institutional changes, and how much is due to a
country specic e¤ect.10 The country specic e¤ect explains most of the change in
structural unemployment in almost every country.11
Furthermore, the results from estimations of specications of the above kind are
not very robust. Baker et. al survey six recent papers12 and nd that the estimated
e¤ects of changes to the tax wedge, benet duration and the replacement rate vary
quite substantially: For instance, the e¤ect of an increase in benet duration by one
year ranges from 0.7% to 1.4%.13 Baker et.al. also report that an earlier version of
the Nickell et al paper covering a period shorter by three years produced estimates
which were very di¤erent from the nal version, implying that Nickell et als results
are apparently very sensitive to the inclusion of additional data.14 Finally, Belot/ van
Ours (2004) nd that the signicance of institutional variables is extremely sensitive
to the inclusion of time and country xed e¤ects.15
One of the crucial the underlying assumptions of panel data regressions of un-
employment on labour market institution is that labour market institutions are ex-
ogenous and are not a¤ected by those force which are a¤ecting unemployment or by
unemployment itself. This assumption might for instance be violated with respect
to the tax wedge, as rising unemployment increases expenditures on transfers and
erodes the tax base. The problem is sometimes mentioned but is not addressed, and
rarely tested for.16 The Elmeskov et a. (1998) study argues that causality could run
7See IMF (2003), pp. 138-141.
8See Nickell (2002), pp. 44-45.
9See Nickel et al (2005), p. 15.
10See Elmeskov et. al (1998). This paper was part of the research following up the Job study.
11See Elmeskov et. al (1998), p. 220, Table 3a.
12(Nickel 1997, Elmeskov et al 1998, Belot/van ours 2002, Nickel et al 2002, Blanchard/Wolfers
2000, Bertola et. al. 2001)
13See Baker et al (2002), pp.43-44.
14See Baker et. al (2003), p. 35.
15See Belot/Van Ours (2004), p. 635.
16See for instance Nickell et al (2002), p.2, or IMF (2003). See also Blanchard (2007), p. 415.
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both ways in case of benet generosity and the tax wedge. Unemployment Granger
causes benet generosity in Belgium, France, Italy, the UK, the United States and
the Netherlands, while it Granger causes unemployment in Austria, Ireland and Nor-
way.17
3 Productivity Growth and Unemployment
There is plenty of evidence that changes in productivity growth a¤ect unemploy-
ment using various approaches. An early example are Bruno and Sachs (1982), who
argue that a labour productivity slowdown which was unanticipated by workers wage
demands caused unemployment in British manufacturing to increase.18 Productivity
growth or total factor productivity growth are sometimes controlled for in regressions
aiming to assess the impact of labour market institutions. For instance, in the IMF
study cited above, a one p.p. reduction in productivity growth increases unemploy-
ment by 0.32 percentage points, while the Nickel et al study cited above nds that
a 1 percentage point decrease in total factor productivity (TFP) growth causes a
1.28 p.p. increase in unemployment. Fitoussi et al. (2000) test for the role of pro-
ductivity growth and other shocks, the e¤ects of which are allowed to vary across
countries. For Germany, the equation predicts that one percentage point reduction
in productivity growth would cause a 0.79 percentage point increase in unemploy-
ment, while for France, Italy or Spain the e¤ect would be as high as 1.6, 1.22 or 2.22
p.p.19 Ball and Mo¢ tt (2001) use a Phillips Curve based approach and argue that
di¤erences between workers wage aspirations and productivity growth can explain
the non-inationary unemployment reduction in the United States in the 1990s.20
Pissarides and Vallanti (2005) uses a multi equation approach to investigate the ef-
fects of a productivity slowdown and nd an (implied e¤ect) of a 1 percentage point
reduction in TFP growth on unemployment of 1.31 percentage point in the EU.21
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) estimate a specication which explicitly models the
interactions of shocks and institutions, i.e. institutional variable e¤ectively become
part of the coe¢ cient on the shocks. The shocks include TFP growth, the long run
real interest rate and a measure of labour demand, while the institutions considered
are the replacement rate as measured in Nickell (1997), benet duration (in years),
employment protection (simple ranking from 1 to 20), the tax wedge as in Nickell
et al (2002) and measures of union contract coverage, union density and bargaining
coordination.22 Both shocks and institutions are signicant, though concerning the
later this nding is not robust against variations in the way the variables are mea-
17See Elmeskov et. al. (1998), pp. 248-249.
18See Bruno/ Sachs (1982), p. 700/701.
19See Fitoussi et al (2000), pp. 247 to 250.
20Ball and Mo¢ t (2001).
21See Pissarides and Vallanti (2005), p.20, table 4.
22See Blanchard/Wolfers (2001), p. C19.
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sured.23 A one percentage point reduction in TFP growth increases unemployment
by 0.71 p.p. if institutions are at the sample average. More employment unfriendly
institutions cause the shock to have higher e¤ects, so that the model can explain both
cross country di¤erences and the evolution of unemployment over time.
In this paper we will develop a model generating a slowdown in productivity
growth endogenously via a slowdown in capital stock growth, which will then in turn
increase unemployment.
4 Monetary Policy and the NAIRU
Ball argues the change in the NAIRU during the 1980s can be explained by the mon-
etary policy stance. He measures the stance of policy during that period indirectly
by the behaviour of ination (Ball (1996)), and directly by examining the evolution
of real interest rates (Ball(1999)) during the recessions at the beginning of the 1980s.
In the rst paper, Ball employs two measures of ination dynamics: The size of the
disination from 1980 to 1990 and the length of the longest disination during that
period. Those matter because the former is related to the size of the unemploy-
ment increase, while the latter indicates for how long the actual unemployment rate
exceeded the NAIRU.
Ball nds that while the length and the size of disination explain a substantial
share of the increase in the NAIRU over the ten year period, large prediction errors
remain. He examines whether interaction between benet duration and the policy
stance does a better job at explaining the rise in the NAIRU. 24 The t is substan-
tially superior to when the policy variables are not interacted with benet duration,
especially for the change in ination. 25 Ball then subjects this procedure to a series
of robustness experiments, all of which basically conrm the previous results.26 The
correlation between the change in ination and the change in the NAIRU emphasized
by Ball is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the change in the NAWRU against the
change in CPI Ination for 21 OECD countries from 1980 to 1990 and from 1990 to
2000. The negative correlation is not perfect but very obvious.27
Ball then turns towards the role of monetary as measured by the largest cumulative
decrease of short term real interest rates in any part of the recessions rst year.28 He
considers two dependent variables: the change in the NAIRU from the peak before the
23See Blanchard/Wolfers (2000), p. C31.
24See Ball (1996), p. 13. The motivation for the joint role are theories of labour market hysteresis.
25Ball (1996), p. 12.
26See Ball (1996), pp. 13-15.
27The data is taken from the OECD Outlook. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, U.S.A.
28Ball notes that his dating criterion for recessions yields only two countries with two recessions
and thus is stricter than the one used with quarterly data. See Ball (1999), p. 205.
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rst recession until ve years after the peak, and this change divided by the change in
actual unemployment over the same time period. The later variable is called degree
of hysteresis and accounts for the fact that the severity of recessions and thus the
increase in actual unemployment vary over the sample and hence one would observe
di¤erent increases in the NAIRU even if actual unemployment fed into the NAIRU
to the same extent in all countries, i.e. if monetary policy and benet duration had
been the same.29 Fit is substantially better when the degree of hysteresis is used as a
dependent variable, with an adjusted R2 of 0.62 as opposed to 0.43. Concerning the
quantitative impact of the two variables on the degree of hysteresis, "The coe¢ cient
on maximum easing implies that raising that variable from 0 to 6 (Swedens value, the
highest in the sample) reduces the degree of hysteresis by 0.54. Reducing the duration
of unemployment benets from indenite to half a year reduces the degree of hysteresis
by 0.35. Thus policymakers can reduce hysteresis through both macroeconomic and
labour market policy, and the former has somewhat larger e¤ects."30 Hence both
papers evidence suggests that monetary policy a¤ect the NAIRU and the more so
the more rigid the labour market.
Ball also tries to explain reductions in the NAIRU in OECD countries by referring
to the stance of monetary policy relative to the situation of the macro economy, and
nds that to some extent, monetary policy can also explain NAIRU reductions.
Change in CPI Inflation vs. Change in the NAIRU: 1980-
1990, 1990-2000
-10.00%
-8.00%
-6.00%
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
-20.00% -15.00% -10.00% -5.00% 0.00% 5.00%
Change in CPI Inflation
Ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
NA
IR
U
Figure 1
29See Ball (1999), p. 205-206.
30Ball (1999), p. 207.
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5 The Model
While the previous section argues that there exists empirical evidence which links
the monetary policy stance to the subsequent evolution of the NAIRU, this section
develops a dynamic general equilibrium model which can explain why that might
be the case. First, however, we will develop what we consider the starting point of
our analysis, a model coarsely incorporating the ruling consensus of the relationship
between unemployment and the NAIRU. This consensus has been sketched by Nickell
et al as follows:
First, unemployment in the short-run and in the long-run is deter-
mined by real demand. Second, over the long term, real demand d and
unemployment generally tend towards the level consistent with stable in-
ation. This we term equilibrium level. Various possible mechanisms
may be at work here. For example, many OECD countries now set mon-
etary policy on the basis of an ination target which naturally moves
real demand and unemployment towards the equilibrium dened above.
Third, the equilibrium level of unemployment is a¤ected rst, by any
variable which inuences the ease with which unemployed individuals can
be matched to available job vacancies, and second, by any variable which
tends to raise wages in a direct fashion despite excess supply in the labour
market.31
Therefore this section is structured as follows. While 5.1 deals with the household
optimisation problem whose rst order conditions determine consumption, invest-
ment and capital accumulation in our mode in a quite standard fashion, but also the
supply of e¤ort which determines the e¢ ciency of a unit of labour. 5.2 then shows
how, given this e¤ort function, cost minimisation makes the representative rm pay
an e¢ ciency wage. Hence the labour supply condition is replaced by a wage set-
ting function, thus generating unemployment. 5.3 introduces nominal rigidities, thus
implying that output is demand determined. Section 5.4 species a monetary policy
reaction function which sets the interest rate as a function of the deviation of ination
from its target and the output gap. Section 5.5 discusses how endogenous growth is
introduced into the model and how this a¤ects the models equations derived so far.
Section 5.6 summarises the aggregate equations for the convenience of the reader and
introduces specic functional forms where that has not been carried out earlier.
5.1 Households
Danthine and Kurmann (2004) show how to introduce unemployment in a general
equilibrium model without moving away from the representative agent framework. In
31See Nickel et al (2002), p. 2-3. See also Jackman, Layard and Nickel (1993), p. 8-11.
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the Danthine-Kurmann setup (later on referred to as "DK"), individuals are organized
in families in a zero-one continuum of families which are innitely lived. All decisions
regarding the intertemporal allocation of consumption and the accumulation of capital
are made at the family level. Each family member supplies one unit of labour in
elastically but derives disutility from the e¤ort G(et+i) he or she supplies in their
job. The share of unemployed members is the same for each family. The large family
assumption means that although there are unemployed individuals in the economy, it
is not necessary to track the distribution of wealth. In addition, some workers supply
overhead labour, whose nature will be described in more detail below. They can be
thought of as the owners of the monopolistically competitive rms. Overhead workers
never become unemployed because no rm can produce without a certain amount of
overhead sta¤. A share ns of the workforce will be employed by the government who
is assumed to pay the same wages as the private sector who are funded by lump sum
taxes.32 It is assumed that each family has the same amount of overhead workers.
Families solve the following maximisation problem:
U = Et
( 1X
i=0
i [u(Ct+i   habt+i 1)  (nt+i   n)G(et+i)]
)
; u0 > 0; u00 < 0: (1)
s:t: (nt   n)wt + Bt 1
Pt
(1 + it 1) +zt + rktKt  Ct+i +
Bt
Pt
+ Tt + It and (2)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It

1  S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

; S (0) = 0; S (0)0 = 0; S (0)
00
> 0
(3)
Each period families derive instantaneous utility u (Ct   habt 1) from consump-
tion Ct+i; which is a CES consumption basket Ct =
hR 1
0
(ct(i))
( 1)
 di
i 
 1
: Con-
sumers spread their consumption over the various goods in the CES basket Ct in
a cost minimising fashion, implying that the optimal demand for good i is given
by ct(i) = Ct

pt(i)
Pt
 
; where Pt denotes the price index of the consumption bas-
ket. Following Smets and Wouters (2002), we introduce external habit formation:
habt 1 = jCt 1; j < 1: This is mainly to make the very short run responses of output
32The chief reason of introducing both the share of state employees and overhead workers is to
achieve a reasonable calibration of steady state values. As is well known, the Romer model has
strong scale e¤ects, i.e. the level of employment a¤ects the growth rate. This is due to the fact that,
as shown below, the marginal product of capital becomes an increasing function of employment and
a decreasing function of the depreciation rate. The marginal product of capital governs determines
the growth rate by determining the willingness of households to save and thus the economys growth
rate. To achieve a reasonable steady state growth rate, it is thus necessary to either assume a very
high depreciation rate or to remove part of the labour force from "productive" sector and thus to
reduce the impact of employment on the marginal product of capital, by assuming that they perform
necessary tasks without which the productive sector could not operate (managerial work in case of
overhead workers, policing etc. in case of the state employees). We opted for the second solution.
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and employment to the cost push shock we will perform later more reasonable (i.e.
lower) but it does not a¤ect the basic thrust of the results presented here. A fam-
ilys period t income consists wages wt, interest income it 1 on risk less bonds they
bought in the previous period, Bt 1, the prots of the monopolistically competitive
rms in the economy zt, and dividends rkt from renting out the capital Kt they have
accumulated up to time t. They have to pay lump sum taxes Tt:Families accumulate
capital by making investment expenditure It according to the capital accumulation
equation displayed below the budget constraint. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2002), 33 we assume adjustment costs in
investment: only a fraction of one unit of investment expenditure is actually turned
into additional capital Kt , and this fraction decreases in the investment growth rate.
The assumptions on the rst derivative of the S (:) function implies that adjustment
costs vanish when the economy is growing at its steady state growth rate g, im-
plying that the steady state growth rate does not depend on the parameters of the
adjustment cost function S:34 Setting up the lagrangian and denoting the lagrange
multipliers of the budget constraint and the capital accumulation constraint as t and
tqt yields the following rst order conditions with respect to consumption, capital
and investment:
u0(Ct   habt 1) = Et

u0(Ct+1   habt) 1
1 + t+1

[1 + it] (4)
t = u
0(Ct   habt 1) (5)
Et
 
t+1r
k
t+1 + t+1qt+1 (1  )

= tqt (6)
tqt

1  S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

  It
It 1
S 0

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

(7)
+Et
"
t+1qt+1

It+1
It
2
S 0

It+1
It
  (1 + g)
#
= t (8)
Note that with this notation, qt denotes the present discounted value of the fu-
ture prots associated with buying another unit of capital today, also known as
Tobins q. Adjustment cost will be assumed to have the following functional form:
S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

= 
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2
:
The e¤ort function of individual j G(et+i (j)) is of the form
G(et(j) =
 
et(j) 
 
0 + 1 logwt(j) + 2(nt   n)
+3 logwt + 4 logwt 1 + 5 log

wt 1(nt 1 n ns)
Y Pt 1
 !!2
;(9)
1; 5 > 0; 2; 3; 4 < 0; 1 >  3
33See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), p.12, and Smets and Wouters (2002), p.13.
34See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, p.15.
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where Yt is private sector output. Note that the e¤ort function enters the families
utility separately which implies that it is independent of the budget constraint, and
that state employees are assumed not to perform any e¤ort while at work. The rst
order condition with respect to e¤ort is
et(j) = 0 + 1 logwt(j) + 2 (nt   n) + 3 logwt (10)
+4 logwt 1 + 5 log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

(11)
The rst of those is the familiar consumption Euler equation, while the second
determines the optimal e¤ort level. The structure of the e¤ort function is motivated
by the idea of "gift exchange" between the rm and the worker: The workers gift to
the employer is e¤ort, who in exchange responds by good treatment of the worker,
summarised here by the wage wt(j). Accordingly, a higher contemporary average
wage wt reduces e¤ort because it represents a "reference level" which the current
employers wage o¤er is compared with, and a higher average past real wage wt 1
boosts the workers aspirations as well.35 On the other hand, a higher labour share
in the previous period wt 1nt 1
Yt 1
boosts e¤ort. Finally, the aggregate employment level
of non-overhead workers (nt   n) summarizes labour market tightness and is thus
positively related to the workers outside options, and thus also tends to reduce e¤ort.
The employer takes this relationship into account when setting the wage, as will
discussed further below. The view that wages have a big e¤ect on morale because
they signal to the worker how his contribution to the organizational goals is valued
and that this generates substantial downward wage rigidity has found considerable
support by a microeconomic survey conducted by Bewley (1998), who interviewed
over 300 business people, labour leaders and business consultants.36
5.2 Cost Minimisation and E¢ ciency Wages
The production technology is a Cobb Douglas production function,
Yt(i) = AKt(i)
(TFPtet(i) (nt(i)  n))1 , where the output of rm i Yt(i) de-
pends on the capital stock of rm i Kt(i), the e¢ ciency of its workers et(i) and
the number of non-overhead workers nt(i)   n: In the Danthine and Kurman model
(2004), in a rst stage the rm minimises its cost of producing a given amount of
35See Danthine and Kurmann (2004), pp. 111-113. It would be desirable to have the individual
workers past real wage wt (j) in the equation but that would considerably complicate the maximi-
sation problem of the representative rm dealt with later, so we follow Danthine and Kurman in
assuming a dependence of e¤ort on the average wage. For the same reason we include the private
sector labour share rather than the labour share of the rm where the worker is employed.
36See Bewley (1998), pp. 459-490. A discussion of further evidence is Bewley (2004). Bewley
also argues that his ndings contradicts essentially all theoretical justications of real wage rigidity
not based on gift exchange considerations, like implicit constants, insider outsider models or the
e¢ ciency wage models based on no-shirking conditions.
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output. To do so it hires capital in an economy wide market and furthermore decides
on the wage it is going to pay, taking into account the relationship between e¤ort and
wages given by 10.37 Hence the rms problem is:
min
Kt(i);nt(i);wt(i)
rktKt(i) + wt(i)(nt(i)  n)s:t:Yt(i) = AKt(i)(TFPtet(i) (nt(i)  n))1 
and et(i) = 0 + 1 logwt(i) + 2 (nt   n) + 3 logwt
+4 logwt 1 + 5 log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Y Pt 1

by appropriately choosing Kt(i), nt(i); wt(i) and et(i) as the rm is conscious of
the relationship between e¤ort et(i) and wages. This yields for capital and labour the
rst order conditions
rkt = mct (i)
Yt(i)
Kt(i)
(12)
wt(i) = (1  )mct (i) Yt(i)
nt(i)  n
were mct(i) and rkt refer to real marginal costs of rm i and the capital rental rate,
which is the price at which the capital stock, is traded, respectively. The aggregate
capital stock is predetermined each period and its production will be dealt with in
the next section. It will be shown below that even though all rms set the wage
individually, rms will nd it optimal to set the same wage. This then means that
the capital to (productive) labour ratio, the output per unit of productive labour
ratio, the output per unit of productive labour ratio and marginal costs are the same
in all rms, as can be easily veried by dividing the two rst order conditions, which
gives the capital to productive labour ratio as Kt(i)
nt(i) n =

1 
wt
rkt
: Substituting this back
into equation (12) yields an equation for mct(i) containing only labour augmenting
technological progress and the factor price, implying that marginal costs are the same
across all rms:
mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1TFPt)1 
(13)
This also implies that for the capital rental and for the real wage we have
rkt = mct
Yt
Kt
(14)
wt = (1  )mct Yt
nt   ns   n (15)
37See Danthine/ Kurman (2004), pp. 114-115.
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We now turn to wage setting. The rst order conditions with respect to e¤ort and
wages are
nt(i)  n = t1
wt(i)
(16)
t = (1  )mct
Yt(i)
et(i)
Combining those with the rst order condition with respect to labour yields an
optimal e¤ort level equal to 1. Substituting this back into the e¤ort function 10
and noting that, as the rms wage depends only on aggregate variables which are
the same for all rms, it must indeed hold that wt(i) = wt yields the wage setting
relation:
logwt = logwt(i) =
1   0
1 + 3
  2
1 + 3
(nt   n)  4
1 + 3
logwt 1 (17)
  5
1 + 3
log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

(18)
Hence with the coe¢ cient restrictions imposed above, the wage depends positively
on the past real wage and non-overhead employment. It will be above its market
clearing level and thus there is unemployment in the economy.
Equation (17) could be solved for a long run real wage if  4
1+3
< 1: As mentioned
above however, in our model, unlike in the Danthine/ Kurmanns, is a growth model,
and so the real wage must be growing in the steady state. Therefore a function relating
the wage level to employment is not appropriate unless one includes productivity
growth as an additional argument. A major driving force of the results of this paper
however is that wages are not perfectly indexed to productivity growth. The easiest
way to deal with the issue therefore seems to set   4
1+3
= 1, which means that we
have real wage growth function, or real wage Phillips curve:
logwt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

; (19)
with a =
0   1
1 + 3
, b =   2
1 + 3
> 0 and c =   5
1 + 3
< 0 (20)
Setting   (3 + 4) = 1 implies that to compensate for the e¤ort diminishing e¤ect
of a 1 percent increase in the "reference level" of the real wage, as represented by the
current average real wage and the past average real wage, the rm has to increase its
own wage by the same percentage.
Equation (19) is a real wage Phillips Curve plus an "error correction term" repre-
sented by the log of the labour share. Empirical estimates of (19) (usually replacing
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nt with the unemployment rate) or variants thereof repeatedly nd c=0 for the United
states but c < 0 for European countries.38 This will later provide a way to distin-
guish real wage rigidity between the United States and Europe. It has been argued
by Blanchard and Katz (1999) that the presence of a labour share term is required
for an e¤ect of "any factor that decrease the wages rms can a¤ord to pay [...] con-
ditional on the level of technology" on unemployment.39 Examples of those would be
payroll taxes. Indeed we can reproduce here the simple textbook response of steady
state employment to changes in payroll taxes and the mark-up as well as the result
of Blanchard and Katz concerning the role of the parameter c. As we will assume
imperfect competition later, in the steady state, marginal cost equal the inverse of the
mark-up ; i.e. mc =  1: From (13) ; it is easy to see that in the steady state, with
rk and mc constant, real wages grow the same rate as total factor productivity, which
we denote as g: (13) is essentially a textbook price setting function, giving the real
wage (and its growth rate) consistent with rms realising their mark-up. Assuming
that there is a tax  on real wages, implying a net wage of (1  )wt; substituting
(15) into (19) for wt 1, and noting that in the steady state, mc =  1; we have
nt =
 c
b
log

(1  ) (1  )


+
log (1 + g)
b
  a
b
Clearly, an increase in payroll taxes and a reduction in product market competition
(i.e. an increase in the mark-up) both decrease employment, while an increase in
productivity growth increases employment as long as c < 0; but have no e¤ect if c=0.
c (as well as a and b) is not explicitly derived here but can be thought of as implicitly
depending institutional variables. Thus the wage setting relationship resulting from
the e¢ ciency wage model used here coarsely incorporates the e¤ect of labour market
institutions on unemployment.
It remains to determine the size of the overhead labour force. Following Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1999), it is assumed that in the steady state, all prot generated
by employing productive labour and capital goes to the overhead sta¤ so that the
rm ends up with zero prots.40 This is justied because setting up production is im-
possible without overhead labour and the rms prot is thus essentially equal to the
38See Blanchard and Katz (1999), p.73, and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p.484-486. Note that
(19) di¤ers from the empirical specication in that it is the private sector labour share, assuming
that overhead workers are essentially the self employed. This is done to simplify calculations. Note
that in (19) we can very easily replace the labour share term by (1  )mct 1. This manipulation
would not be possible if we were using the labour share for the total economy, including the state
sector (assuming that the value added of state employees would be measured with the wages they
are paid, as is common practice in national accounts). However, it can be shown that the e¤ect of
an employment change on the labour share would be even greater if we included state employees.
This would essentially make persistent reductions in real wage growth even harder and thus, which,
as will become clear later, would be expected to enhance the e¤ects we are interested in showing
here.
39Blanchard and Katz (1999), p.72.
40See Rotemberg/ Woodford (2004), pp. 15-16.
15
collective marginal product of its overhead sta¤. We assume that the overhead sta¤
splits this prot equally. As mentioned above, it is assumed that there is full employ-
ment among overhead workers and that the amount of overhead workers required and
employed is such that the real wage for overhead and non-overhead workers will be
exactly the same in the steady state. These assumptions allow for a straightforward
way to determine the amount of overhead and non-overhead workers as a function of
total employment: Zero prot requires
  1

Yt   wtn = 0
where  1

is the share of rms prots in output. Substituting wt = (1   ) 1 Ytnpt n
gives after some manipulation
  1
1   =
n
npt   n
 s
which is the ratio of overhead labour to productive labour, which we call s: Using
npt = n+ (n
p
t   n) ; we arrive at
npt   n =
npt
1 + s
(21)
n =
s
1 + s
npt
which gives the amount of productive and overhead labour as a function of employ-
ment.
5.3 Price Setting and Nominal Rigidities
Each rm produces one of the variants of the output good in the CES basket. Given
that investment expenditure stretches over these variants in precisely the same way
as consumption demand, we can write yt+i(j) = Yt+i

pt+i(j)
Pt+i
 
. It is assumed that
the representative rm faces costs if it alters its individual price ination from a
reference level   1, which would usually be the steady state level of ination in the
economy. These costs arise because deviating from the "standard" level of ination
requires the rm to engage in a re optimisation process which has to be carried out by
high paid marketing professionals, while small price changes can be decided by lower
paid "frontline" sta¤. Apart from that, customers dislike price volatility because it
requires them to switch between products, which the rm has to compensate by extra
marketing e¤orts, special o¤ers etc. These costs are likely to increase in the rms
output as well. Following Lubik/Marzo (2007), we assume the following functional
form:
ACt+i(j) =
'
2
(
pt+i(j)
pt+i 1(j)
  )2yt+i(j) (22)
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Demand for the rms product is as follows: yt+i(j) = Yt+i

pt+i(j)
Pt+i
 
:The rm j
chooses its price pt+i(j) in order to maximise
1X
i=0
Et

t;t+i

pt+i(j)
Pt+i
yt+i(j) mct+iyt+i(j)  ACt+i(j)

(23)
where t;t+i denotes the discount factor used to discount real prots earned in period
t+i back to period t. Note that because households own the rms, we have t;t+i =
i u
0(Ct+i)
u0(Ct) : Di¤erentiating with respect to pt(j) and noting that, as all rms are the
same, pt(j) = Pt holds ex post yield
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  

Pt
Pt 1
+ 
'
2
(
Pt
Pt 1
  )2
+Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
  

Pt+1
Pt

= 0 (24)
which is a nonlinear version of the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, which
relates current ination to expected future ination, and implies a steady state value
for marginal cost ( for Pt
Pt 1
= Pt+1
Pt
= ) of  1

: It is, however, a consistent feature
of empirical estimations of Phillips curves that specications which include lagged
ination ("hybrid" Phillips curves") perform better than those which include only
expected next periods ination because ination has inertia.41 Backward looking
elements are easily introduced into the price setting considerations of the rm by
assuming that the reference level of ination does not remain constant over time but
equals last periods ination, i.e. t =
Pt 1
Pt 2
: If the ination rate becomes higher for
several periods, rms will mandate frontline sta¤ to handle price increases of that
size in order to keep costs low, and customers will get used to the di¤erent pace of
price changes as well. Hence we have
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
+ 
'
2
(
Pt
Pt 1
  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2 (25)
+Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
  Pt
Pt 1

Pt+1
Pt

= 0 (26)
As the simulation experiment which we aim to conduct is a disination, we have
to introduce an inationary shock, like for instance an oil price shock. We account
for such a shock by adding a so called "cost-push shock" ut to the Phillips curve
equation. This shock increases current ination, holding the values of past ination
41See for instance Gali/Gertler (2000).
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and marginal costs constant. This gives
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

+ 
'
2
(

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2
(27)
+Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
 

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

Pt+1
Pt

= 0 (28)
While it would certainly be desirable to derive such a shock from rst principles, like
for instance explicitly including energy in the production function, the road taken
here has the advantage of simplicity and is in line with the New-Keynesian literature
as well.42
Although we will simulate a non-linearised version of the model below, it is still
insightful to linearise the Phillips Curve for purpose of comparison with other spec-
ications found in the literature and in empirical studies. This is all the more so
as simulating a model with a linearised Phillips Curve does yield results which are
pretty close to the model featuring the non-linearised Phillips Curve. Linearising 25
around the steady state gives
t =
t 1
1 + (1 + g)
+
(   1)cmct
' (1 + (1 + g))
+
(1 + g)
1 + (1 + g)
Ett+1 (29)
The steady state discount rate  can be replaced by  u
0(Ct+1 Habt)
u0(Ct Habt 1) : Hence for the
case of logarithmic utility (u(Ct) = ln(Ct  Habt 1)) and as consumption, habit and
output will all grow at the same rate in the steady state, we have
t =
(   1)
'
cmct + Ett+1 (30)
and
t =
t 1
1 + 
+
(   1)cmct
' (1 + )
+

1 + 
Ett+1 (31)
for the hybrid Phillips Curve. Note that these equations resemble very closely spec-
ications which are obtained by Woodford (2003) under the assumption of Calvo
contracts but di¤erent degrees of indexing of the prices of those rms which can not
re-optimise prices to past ination. While equation 30 is a purely forward looking
Phillips curve and corresponds to no indexing in the Calvo model, equation 31 cor-
responds to full indexing among those rms which are not able to re-optimise their
prices. In fact, for both equations, the coe¢ cients on expected future ination and
the coe¢ cient on lagged ination in the second equation exactly match Woodfords re-
sults.43 In the simulations carried out below, we will use the (non linearised) hybrid
42See for instance Clarida et al (1999), pages 1665 and 1667.
43See Woodford (2003), p. 215.
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Phillips curve because of the generally superior empirical performance of Phillips
Curves featuring lagged ination. Furthermore, implies that disination is always
costly in terms of output and employment because as  < 1; the weight on lagged
ination exceeds 0.5.44 Costliness is a feature of real world disinations, and recent
estimates the hybrid Phillips Curve by Jondeau and Bihan (2005) suggests that the
coe¢ cients on past and expected ination exceed 0.5 in France, Germany and the
Euro area as a whole and are in fact quantitatively close to the values in equation
31 for standard values of :45 Other evidence supporting the hypothesis of full index-
ation to past prices among non optimising rms has been provided by estimations
of complete general equilibrium models with the goal of matching impulse response
functions of monetary shocks. Examples of this are Woodford and Giannoni (2003)
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).46 Furthermore, if disination were
costless even in the short run, the persistent e¤ects of monetary policy which are the
subject of this paper could not arise.
It is instructive to add the cost push shock to 31 and solve forward, which yields
t   t 1 =    1
'
1X
i=0
(Etcmct+i) + (1 + ) 1X
i=0
Etut+i (32)
This shows that, up to a linear approximation, 27 is in fact a forward looking ac-
celerationist Phillips Curve: If present and future marginal costs are at their steady
state level and present and future values of cost push shock are zero, ination will be
constant, while it will accelerate or decelerate otherwise. This means that the model
has a well dened NAIRU.
5.4 Monetary Policy
Monetary Policy will be assumed to follow a simple Taylor type nominal interest rate
rule. The exact specication will vary across simulations, though all specications
will include a lagged dependent variable in order to account for the interest rate
inertia observed in the data. The baseline rule will be a rule which reacts to current
ination and the lagged output gap:
it = (1  ) i+ (1  ) t + (1  )
 Y
4
gpt 1 + it 1 (33)
where i;  and gpt denote the long-run real interest rate (recall that ination is
zero in the steady state), the degree of interest rate smoothing and the output gap,
44As was shown by Chadha et al (1992), this is a su¢ cient condition to prevent the path of
disination from being completely costless. Intuitively, a reduction in expected ination reduces
ination today, and a lower coe¢ cient on expected ination means that todays ination will be
reduced by less for any given output level. See Chadha et al (1992), p. 403.
45See Jondeau/ Bihan (2005), pp. 521-550.
46See Woodford (2003), p. 351 and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), pp. 30-32.
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respectively, while   and  Y denote the long run coe¢ cients on ination and the
output gap. Hence the central bank responds to the lagged value of the output gap
but current values of ination, on the grounds that output data is usually available
only with a lag while data on ination arrives earlier.
The output gap is the percentage deviation from its natural level Y nt , which is the
output level which would set marginal costs equal to its long run level  1; given the
capital stock, and the previous periods real wage. As can be obtained from equation
(32), this would ensure that in the absence of cost push shocks, ination is neither
rising nor falling. The employment level corresponding to this output level will be
referred to as "natural employment" nnt . The natural levels of output and employment
are derived by substituting the equation for the rental on capital (14) and the wage
setting equation (19) into (13) and setting mct =  1:The natural levels of output
and employment are then given by the values of Y nt and n
n
t solving
 1 =
(nnt   ns   n) (wt 1 exp(a+ b (nnt   n)))
A (1  ) (1TFPt)1 Kt
(34)
Y nt = AKt
(TFPt1 (n
n
t   ns   n))1  (35)
Note that given the past real wage, the capital stock has a postive e¤ect on natural
employment given the past real wage This e¤ect works through the negative e¤ect of
a higher capital stock on the capital rental through the factor price frontier, which
tends to lower marginal costs and thus makes room for the higher real wage which is
generated by higher employment through the wage setting equation.
5.5 Introducing Endogenous Growth
The basic idea in the knowledge spill over model is to start o¤ with a standard
neoclassical production function with labour augmenting technical progress just like
the one used above, with the di¤erence that labour augmenting technological progress
might be rm specic:
Yt(i) = F (Kt(i); TFPt (i)nt(i)) (36)
Romer then makes two crucial assumptions:
 Increasing its physical capital simultaneously teaches the rm how to produce
more e¢ ciently. This idea was rst suggested by Arrow (1962). For simplicity,
in the Romer setup TFPt (i) is simply proportional to the rms capital stock.
 Knowledge is a public good. Hence each rms knowledge is in fact proportional
to the aggregate capital stock rather than to its own.47 However, the impact of
the rms capital stock on the aggregate capital stock is so small that they can
be neglected. Thus the production function of rm i becomes
47See Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp.21-22.
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Yt(i) = F (Kt(i); Ktnt(i)) (37)
This implies that there are now constant returns to capital at the economy wide
level, allowing per capita output to grow. However, there are still decreasing returns
to capital at the rm level. In the Romer model, where the labour force is in elastically
supplied and wages are perfectly exible, this leads to an ine¢ ciently low choice of the
capital stock. In turn, this leads to a growth rate which is ine¢ ciently low because
saving is to low as the individual return on capital falls short of the social return on
capital. Thus introducing endogenous growth in this fashion is equivalent to replacing
TFPt by Kt in the above equations.
Note that the steady state in the learning by doing model satises the famous ve
stylized facts of growth: Output per capita and capital per labour keep increasing,
the capital output ratio is trend less, the real wage per unit of labour keeps increasing,
the rate of prot is trend less and the share of GDP going to capital and labour are
trend less as well. This will also be true for the model developed below. Thus from
an empirical point of view, there is no reason rendering the neoclassical production
function superior to the alternative employed here.
Thus we set TFPt = Kt in the above equations. This a¤ects the production
function and the marginal cost equation (13), which become
mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1Kt)1 
(38)
Yt = AKt(1 (nt   ns   n))1  (39)
Obviously, the capital stock now has a stronger e¤ect on both marginal costs and out-
put than in the absence of endogenous growth. For a given capital rental (that means
assuming that output expands at the same rate and employment stays constant) and
a given real wage, an increase in the capital stock by 1% for a given capital rental
reduces marginal costs by (1  )%; while in the absence of endogenous growth, it
only has an indirect e¤ect through the capital rental. Indeed, we will see that the
movement of the real wage to capital ratio is crucial for understanding the employ-
ment dynamics in the in the simulations of the economy with endogenous growth to
be discussed later. Accordingly, the capital stock also has a greater e¤ect on natural
employment and the NAIRU: Equations (34) and (35) become
 1 =
(nnt   ns   n)wt 1 exp(a+ b (nnt   n))
A(1  )(1)1 Kt
(40)
Clearly, a n increase in the capital stock now accommodates a larger increase in
employment than in (35) :
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5.6 The Aggregate Equations
This section summarises the models aggregate equations developed above for con-
venience of the reader and introduces explicit functional forms where that has not
yet been done above. As many of the economies variables are growing in the steady
state (Yt;Ct; It; wt; Kt), simulation of the model requires normalising those variables
in a way which produces constant steady state values. It is very convenient from
a technical point of view to normalise with respect to the capital stock. Just how
that is done is shown in the appendix, as well as how the steady state values of the
variables are calculated.
5.6.1 Aggregate Demand
Aggregate demand consists of consumption, investment and the amount of price ad-
justment costs:
Yt = Ct + It +
'
2
(t   t 1)2Yt (41)
We will assume logarithmic utility so that the consumption Euler equation be-
comes
1= (Ct   habt 1) =  (1 + it)Et

1
(Ct+1   habt) (1 + t+1)

(42)
The level of habit is given by
habt 1 = jCt 1
Investment expenditures is governed by the following equations:
t =
1
Ct  Habt 1 (43)
Et
 
t+1r
k
t+1 + t+1qt+1 (1  )

= tqt (44)
tqt
" 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
  It
It 1


It
It 1
  (1 + g)
#
(45)
+Et
"
t+1qt+1

It+1
It
2


It+1
It
  (1 + g)
#
= t
while the capital accumulation is given by
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It
 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
(46)
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The capital rental is given by
rkt = mct
Yt
Kt
(47)
Note that with endogenous growth, we can write rkt as a function of employment and
marginal costs alone, namely
rkt = mctA(1 (nt   ns   n))1  (48)
5.6.2 Aggregate Supply
What follows are the equations for marginal costs, wage setting and employment. In
the absence of endogenous growth, we have 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1TFPt)1 
(49)
while in the presence of endogenous growth this equations becomes
mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1Kt)1 
(50)
Wages are set according to equation (17):
logwt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

(51)
Output in the absence of endogenous growth is given by
Yt = AKt
(TFPt1 (nt   n  ns))1  (52)
while in the presence of endogenous growth, we have
Yt = AtKt((nt   n  ns)1)1 
The evolution of prices is determined by the Phillips Curve, where we replace the
stochastic discount factor by its denition t;t+1 = 
u0(Ct+1 habt)
u0(Ct habt 1) = 
Ct habt 1
Ct+1 habt
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

+ 
'
2
(

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2
(53)
+Et

Ct   habt 1
Ct+1   habt'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
 

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

Pt+1
Pt

= 0 (54)
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where ut is a cost push variable which is used to introduce the possibility of an
inationary shock (like an oil price shock). The linearised and forward solved version
of this, which is helpful for interpretation of the simulation results, is then
t   t 1 =    1
'
1X
i=0
(Etcmct+i) + (1 + ) 1X
i=0
Etut+i (55)
48 This equation is a forward looking version of the traditional accelerationist Phillips
Curve and says that ination will accelerate if the sum of current and expected future
marginal costs and current and future shocks exceed zero.
Finally, policy is specied by equation 33
it = (1  ) i+ (1  ) t + (1  )
 Y
4
gpt 1 + it 1 (56)
6 Simulation Setup and Calibration
We will present results from two types of simulations. In the rst one, the model
economy is hit by a deterministic cost push shock aimed at creating a scenario akin
to the challenge faced central banks in Western Europe at the end of the seventies
and the beginning of the 1980s. That means we would like to create a situation
were annual ination increases several percentage points above its target level for
some time is then subsequently reduced. Therefore ut is set equal to 0.03 for the
rst quarter and a forecast conditional on this being the case is computed for all the
variables. To put it di¤erently, we have a 3 percentage point increase in quarterly
ination given marginal costs, or 12 percentage point increase at an annualised rate.
In the baseline simulation, this will give rise to a disination of a bit more than 4.6
percentage points over 5 years, which is at the lower end of disinations experienced.
For instance, in Germany, annual ination was at 6.3% in 1981, which was then
reduced to -0.1% in 1986, which is a rather small disination compared to the UK,
France or Italy were ination by 8.6, 10.8 and 13.7 percentage points over the same
period. Note that there is no endogenous persistence in the shock itself beyond
the rst quarter, implying that any persistence in the path of the variables and in
particular employment beyond that point is endogenous. The models are solved
employing a second order approximation to the policy function using the algorithm
of Schmitdt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).49 We consider the second order approximation
appropriate because the model has multiple distortions (unemployment, imperfect
competition, external e¤ects of capital goods production). Therefore precautionary
savings e¤ects which would be lost if the policy function were approximated to rst
order might matter. The only source of uncertainty we consider arises from random
48The derivation is shown in the Appendix. For comparison see Woodford (2003), p. 215.
49See Schmitd-Grohe and Uribe (2004), pp.755 to 775.
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draws of the cost push shock. The solution and the simulations are conducted using
the software Dynare.50
The calibration of the model parameters for the experiment described above is
presented in table 1. It was arrived at as follows. We can distinguish between four
di¤erent types of parameters. The rst set is calibrated according to standard values
in the literature. It consists of the utility discount factor ; the output elasticity
of capital ; the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods  (implying a
mark-up of 1.2 and a share of overhead labour of 17.93%;the depreciation rate ,
the adjustment cost parameter ' and the share of government employees ns. ' is
calibrated as to generate marginal cost coe¢ cient in the Phillips which would also be
generated in a Calvo Phillips Curve with full backward indexing of unchanged prices
if the probability of no re optimisation is 2/3. ns is based on data of the German
statistical o¢ ce on the number of full time equivalent employees in the public sector
and on total hours worked in the economy in 2006.51 Employment in the German
public sector has been shrinking for years and our estimate of its share in total
employment will therefore be rather conservative. The second set of parameters are
the coe¢ cients on employment and the labour share in the wage setting function, b
and c, which are calibrated to be consistent with an estimate of that function, and the
intercept a, which is calibrated to achieve a steady state unemployment rate of 4%, a
procedure also used by Danthine and Kurman (2004).52 We estimate (51) on Germany
quarterly data on hourly labour costs, unemployment and the labour share ranging
from 1970 to 2000 by two stage least squares to account for possible endogeneity of
employment. Our calibration of b and c is consistent with this estimate, which is
reported in the appendix.
The three "free" parameters A,  and j the production function multiple, the pa-
rameter indexing adjustment costs and the degree of habit formation were calibrated
to match second moments of a couple of variables in the New Growth Economy. We
also apply this set of parameters to the JLN economy and report the resulting second
moments as well. We generate the moments, by setting standard deviation of the cost
push shock equal to 0.003, thus producing a sample of 200000 observations generated
by random draws of the stochastic cost push shock. Since we are chiey interested in
50The programme and useful recourses on how to use it can be downloaded from
http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.
51The number of full time equivalents is calculated by adding up employees where each employee
is weighted with the fraction of the 40 hour working week he or she is working. This gives a number
of 4.6 million full time equivalents in 2006, see Statistisches Bundesamt 2007, table 2.3.4. This does
not include employment in incorporated government owned companies. Assuming an average yearly
holiday of a month, this gives an estimate of 8794.76 mio. hours (=40*4.6*365/7*11/12). The
total number of hours by non-self-employed workers for that year was 56001 mio., see Statistisches
Bundesamt (2007), table 2.7. With a calibrated unemployment rate of 4%, we then get a share of
government employment in the total labour force of 15.26%. Assuming that about 3% of the labour
force are employed in government owned rms, we arrive at our calibrated share of government
employees of 18%.
52See Danthine and Kurmann (2004), p.120.
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relative measures, the absolute size of the cost push shock is of little importance. We
choose it so that the standard deviation of employment is close to its value on the
data. j was then calibrated primarily to match the persistence of the consumption
capital ratio (all trended variables are normalised with the capital stock) as measured
by the autocorrelation coe¢ cient up to fth order, while A and  were calibrated to
approximate the standard deviation of the investment output ratio relative to the
output capital ratio.
Table 1: Calibration of non-policy parameters
  j A   1 ' a b c  u1 n
0.33 0.99 0.4 0.38 6 0.025 0.452 30 -0.0307 0.08 0.01 0.65 0.03 0.1793
ns i gTFP 
0.18 0.0181 0.0079 0.003
Finally, there is the monetary policy rule. The baseline calibration of the policy
rule is taken from Clausen and Meier (2003), who estimate a Bundesbank policy rule
over the period from 1973 to 1998 for quarterly data using a real time measure of the
output gap in order to account for the fact that the central banks information set
does not include future levels of GDP. Thus they argue that the estimate of potential
output underlying the output gap measure should be based only on GDP levels known
up to the quarter when the decision on the interest rate is made.53 An important
additional benet of this procedure with respect to the model at hand lies in the fact
that the potential output estimate will evolve in a manner depending more strongly on
past values of actual output than in a procedure which uses the full sample of output
values. This is what we would expect to be the case in our endogenous growth/ sticky
price model, where changes in output via changes in investment have a much stronger
e¤ect on productive capacity than in a model with a neoclassical production function
and xed total factor productivity growth.
Clausen and Meiers best performing procedure for estimating potential output,
a linear trend, yields the statistically signicant coe¢ cients on output, ination and
the lagged interest rate reported in table 2 which in fact correspond to the original
coe¢ cients proposed by Taylor (1993) to characterise the policy of the Federal Re-
serve.54 This is of particular interest for the coe¢ cient on the output gap, because
the Bundesbank was often perceived as paying much less attention to output than the
Fed, which was also borne out by estimates of the Taylor rule.55 Because this paper
aims to explain long swings in Europes big economies by the response of monetary
policy to an inationary shock, wee deem it a conservative approach to use as baseline
coe¢ cients for the policy rule the least hawkish ones in the literature of Bundesbank
53See Clausen/ Meier (2003), p. 2. Note that because Taylor rules are usually estimated using
annualised ination and interest rate data, the coe¢ cient on the output gap has to be divided by 4
to adapt it to quarterly frequency.
54See Clausen/ Meier (2003), pp. 11-12 and p. 22.
55See for instance Clarida et. al (1998), p. 1045, who estimate a statistically insignicant coe¢ -
cient on the output gap of 0.25/4.
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Taylor rule estimates.
Table 2: Baseline calibration of the policy rule: Clausen and Meier
(2003)56
   Y 
1.5 0.52 0.75
However, it is well known to that estimating potential output, and in particular
obtaining output gap measure consistent with the underlying theoretical model are
a tricky business.57 Furthermore, some would argue that the central bank reacts to
forecasts of ination rather than current values. To check the robustness of our re-
sults both with respect to the specication of the interest rate rule, potential output
measurements and estimation methodology, we perform both the deterministic sim-
ulations and the moment comparison also for an alternative forward looking interest
rate rule estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) for the Bundesbank. Their
rule is estimated using monthly data. A quarterly data version of their specication
which we can be used in the models suggested here amounts to
it = (1  ) i+ (1  ) Et

t+1 + t+2 + t+3 + t+4
4

+ (1  )  Y
4
gpt + it 1
(57)
Hence the central bank responds to a one year forecast of ination, the current output
gap and the lagged interest rate.58 They measure potential output using a quadratic
trend of a western German industrial production index and their data set stretches
from 1979 to 1993 and estimate the policy rule using the general method of moments.59
The point estimates are replicated in table 3. Clearly, the small coe¢ cient on the
output gap corresponds more to the conventional wisdom on how the Bundesbank
was conducting policy.
Table 3: Forward looking interest rate rule: Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1998)60
   Y 
1.31 0.25 0.91
7 Some Moment Comparison
We now report the results of comparing the second moments generated by stochastic
simulations of the model economy to the corresponding empirical moments for Ger-
man data. The moment comparison formed an important exercise in the calibration
of the model: the three free parameters ; A and j where calibrated with an eye on
56See Clausen and Meier (2003), p. 22.
57See Gali (2001), p. 12 and Gali and Gertler (1999), pp. 200-205.
58See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), p. 10439 and 1042.
59See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), p. 1040.
60See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), p. 1045.
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the empirical standard deviation of the investment/capital ratio to the output capi-
tal ratio, the persistence of employment and consumption, both as measured by the
rst to fth order autocorrelation. We report some selected second moments of other
important variables to give an idea how the model in the chosen calibration matches
the data. We carry out the same comparison for the JLN economy, and for both the
Baseline policy reaction function and the Clarida Gali Gertler estimate.
We consider the following variables: The ratios of output, consumption, invest-
ment and real wages to capital, denoted as Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht respectively (recall that
we have to normalise all the trended variables with the capital stock to stationarise
them) and employment nt (measured as linearly detrended log hours), the nominal in-
terest rate it, ination t (measured as the change in the GDP deator), productivity
growth pt (measured as change in real GDP per hour worked), capital stock growth
gt, and the investment/ savings rate I=Y: From those, we compute the following mo-
ments: The coe¢ cient of variation for output, the relative standard deviations of Dt
and Rt to GDP, the standard deviations of employment, the savings rate and capital
stock growth , the cross-correlation of all variables with Ft and the autocorrelation
of each variable up to the fth order. We conduct the moment comparison for both
the baseline case and the reaction function estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler.
The construction of the data for Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht are discussed in the Appendix.
The raw data was obtained from the Statistisches Bundesamt, except for the nominal
interest rate data which was obtained from the "International Financial Statistics"
CD-ROM. The data set ranges 1970:Q1 to only 1990:Q4 because reunication is asso-
ciated with a big drop in Ft; Dt and Rt; which would distort moments. Furthermore,
except for employment, ination and the nominal interest rate, there are strong the-
oretical reasons to believe that all of the remaining variables are stationary, which is
why we do not detrend or lter them. However if we adjust the sample if stationarity
is not conrmed by either an ADF test (by rejecting the null of a unit root) or a
KPSS test (by not rejecting the null of stationarity).
The null of stationarity is rejected at the 5% level level for Dt and Ft:After re-
moving the years 70 to 73, we are not rejecting the null of stationarity anymore at
the 10% level for these variables. However, stationarity is rejected for Ht in the re-
duced sample. However the larger sample indicates that Ht is stationary (the null of
stationarity is not rejected at the 5% level):For Rt; the unit root can be rejected over
the entire sample at the 5% level, as is the case for gt and the savings rate. The same
holds for the nominal interest rate, and so we do not detrend this variable either,
while we do detrend the ination rate, because the null of stationarity is rejected
for this variable over the full as well as the reduced sample. Thus we employ the
reduced sample to compute the cross-correlations and relative standard deviations
listed above.
Table 4 reports the various standard deviations, relative standard deviations and
cross-correlations with the output capital ratio Ft listed above. Column 1 contains
the data, while column 2 and 3 refer to the baseline policy reaction function. The
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standard deviation of employment for the New Growth economy is on the mark
because we have calibrated the standard deviation of the cost push to achieve this
goal. The resulting coe¢ cient of variation of Ft for the New Growth Model (NGM)
is smaller than in the data. It is in fact almost equal to the standard deviation of
employment, which is in fact also true for the JLN economy. The relative standard
deviation of Dt in the New Growth model is very closer to the data, while the in the
JLN economy, it is far too low. The relative standard deviation of Rt with respect
to Ft is close to the data in both models but closer in the New Growth economy.
The standard deviations of capital stock growth very close to the data in the New
Growth economy, and such is the standard deviation of capital stock growth relative
to the standard deviation of employment (0.0766 as opposed to 0.0714 in the data)
This is important because changes in the capital stock growth rates drive the results
(and in particular employment) in the New Growth economy discussed in the next
section. We would not want the model to produce a standard deviation of capital
stock growth relative to employment that exceeds the data very much, which is the
situation in the JLN economy.
Turning to the cross-correlations, what is most striking is that for the neoclas-
sical model, corr(it; Ft); corr(t; Ft); corr(pt; Ft) are wrongly signed, being negative
where they should be positive. The New Growth model produces wrong signs for
corr(t; Ft); though the absolute value is much smaller than for the JLN Economy,
and corr(Ht; Ft): The magnitudes of corr(Dt; Ft) and corr(Rt; Ft) are not too far
away from the data for both models, while for corr(nt; Ft); both models produce con-
siderably too high values. It is particularly interesting that the New Growth model
manages to produce a positive correlation between the output capital ratio and the
nominal interest rate. Correctly matching the correlation of output with ination
and the nominal interest rate is generally perceived as a di¢ culty in New Keynesian
models if demand shocks are absent.61
61See for instance Nolan and Thoenissen (2005), p. 25-26.
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Table 4: Relative Standard Deviations and Cross correlations
Moments Data JLN NGM CGG: JLN CGG: NGM
sd:Ft=meanFt 0.0262 0.0115 0.0192 0.0077 0.0215
sd:Dt=sd:Ft 0.6216 0.4447 0.5936 0.4619 0.5910
sd:Rt=sd:Ft 0.4989 0.5783 0.4540 0.6072 0.4812
sd:nt 0.0196 0.0112 0.0209 0.0074 0.0235
sd:It=Yt 0.0092 0.0048 0.0053 0.0035 0.0061
sd:gt 0.0014 0.0012 0.0016 0.0009 0.0018
corr(Dt; Ft) 0.8601 0.95 0.9923 0.8863 0.9906
corr(Rt; Ft) 0.9001 0.9317 0.9953 0.8898 0.9948
corr(nt; Ft) 0.6083 0.950 0.9990 0.8001 0.9991
corr(it; Ft) 0.1521 -0.6772 0.0830 0.0188 0.8804
corr(t; Ft) 0.3252 -0.5071 -0.0901 0.1471 0.2263
corr(pt; Ft) 0.2689 -0.1966 0.7587 -0.2452 0.8262
corr(Ht; Ft) 0.4454 0.4476 -0.6729 0.4468 -0.7258
Table 5 reports the autocorrelation up to the fth order for the data and the
baseline case. For those variables which we do not reject the null of stationarity over
the full sample we use the dataset starting in 1970 rather than the reduced dataset
starting in 1974 in order not to unnecessarily sacrice information. When the i-th
order autocorrelation of a variable is within 0:1of the corresponding autocorrelation
in the sample, it is printed in bold, while a number in italics means that the value
is closer to the data than the i-th order autocorrelation of the same variable in the
competing model. Concerning the variables Ft; Dt;and nt; we observe that the New
Growth economy is matching the persistence the data quite closely, while Rt; gt, it
and It=Yt are considerably less persistent in the New Growth model than in the data.
Conversely, all these variables show far too little persistence in the JLN economy (and
everywhere less than in the New Growth economy): The autocorrelations are dying
o¤ too quickly.
For t;both models produce very similar autocorrelations: The rst order auto-
correlations are a bit too high, the second and third ones are almost matched while
the fourth and fth one is wrongly signed. For pt; both models produce incorrectly
signed rst, and second order autocorrelations. The JLN economy then does match
the sign of the third order autocorrelation but produces wrong signs for the remainder.
The New Growth economy produces a wrong sign for the third order autocorrelation
but almost matches the fourth and matches the sign of the fth. For the real wage
to capital ratio Ht; both models match the rst to third order autocorrelation but
the from then onwards the autocorrelations in the New Growth model are too high,
while the Neoclassical model produces on the mark autocorrelations. Thus the New
Growth model does mostly better than the neoclassical at matching the datas second
moments for the baseline central bank reaction function, with very few exceptions.
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Table 5: Autocorrelations: Baseline
Order of Autocorrelation Data NCM NGM Data NCM NGM
Ft Ft Ft it it it
1 0.85 0.89 0.93 0.9 0.8 0.84
2 0.74 0.65 0.82 0.75 0.49 0.58
3 0.64 0.4 0.71 0.58 0.22 0.38
4 0.55 0.22 0.63 0.39 0.06 0.25
5 0.46 0.08 0.58 0.23 -0.00 0.2
Dt Dt Dt t t t
1 0.93 0.88 0.94 0.25 0.45 0.42
2 0.89 0.65 0.85 0.05 0.1 0.07
3 0.84 0.4 0.76 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09
4 0.79 0.22 0.71 0.2 -0.11 -0.11
5 0.72 0.11 0.68 0.09 -0.08 -0.07
Rt Rt Rt pt pt pt
1 0.96 0.9 0.94 -0.03 0.53 0.84
2 0.91 0.68 0.82 -0.18 0.07 0.67
3 0.86 0.45 0.7 -0.02 -0.21 0.53
4 0.81 0.24 0.6 0.37 -0.31 0.47
5 0.74 0.1 0.54 0.04 -0.27 0.42
nt nt nt Ht Ht Ht
1 0.93 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.99 0.99
2 0.84 0.65 0.84 0.88 0.95 0.97
3 0.73 0.34 0.74 0.84 0.9 0.94
4 0.62 0.20 0.66 0.80 0.84 0.92
5 0.51 0.08 0.62 0.76 0.78 0.89
Order of Autocorrelation Data NCM NG Data NCM NG
g g g I=Y I=Y I=Y
1 0.97 0.9 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.94
2 0.92 0.68 0.82 0.91 0.71 0.82
3 0.88 0.45 0.7 0.87 0.49 0.69
4 0.83 0.24 0.6 0.82 0.3 0.58
5 0.78 0.1 0.54 0.75 0.15 0.51
We now turn to the Clarida, Gali and Gertler reaction function. The relative
standard deviations and cross correlations can be obtained from columns 4 and 5 of
table 4. Again the standard deviations of Ft and nt are quite close to each other for
both models, unlike in the data. The New Growth economy still closely matches the
relative standard deviation of Dt and Rt (the later even better than before) while the
JLN economy the relative standard deviation of Dt is still a good deal too low and
the relative standard deviation of Rt is too high. corr(Dt; Ft) and corr(Rt; Ft) are
almost equal while corr(nt; Ft) is considerably reduced (and thus brought closer to
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the data) for the JLN economy. corr(Ht; Ft) and corr(pt; Ft) also show some change
in magnitude but not in signs. By contrast, corr(t; Ft) becomes positive in both
models, with the New Growth model coming very close to the data, while corr(it; Ft)
becomes positive in the New Growth model. Concerning the autocorrelations, which
are reported in Table 6, note that they generally increase somewhat in the New
Growth model, much so in case of it; but decrease in the neoclassical model, with the
exception of it and t: Thus we conclude that the New Growth model is still better at
matching the second moments discussed here, in particularly the persistence in the
data, than the JLN economy.
Table 6: Autocorrelations: Clarida, Gali Gertler Reaction Function
Order of Autocorrelation Data NCM NGM Data NCM NGM
Ft Ft Ft it it it
1 0.85 0.84 0.96 0.9 0.91 0.99
2 0.74 0.57 0.87 0.75 0.73 0.98
3 0.64 0.30 0.77 0.58 0.55 0.96
4 0.55 0.10 0.69 0.39 0.42 0.93
5 0.46 -0.01 0.64 0.23 0.34 0.91
Dt Dt Dt t t t
1 0.93 0.77 0.96 0.25 0.66 0.49
2 0.89 0.46 0.90 0.05 0.36 0.14
3 0.84 0.23 0.83 -0.03 0.12 -0.06
4 0.79 0.13 0.78 0.2 -0.03 -0.13
5 0.72 0.12 0.74 0.09 -0.1 -0.11
Rt Rt Rt pt pt pt
1 0.96 0.92 0.96 -0.03 0.34 0.9
2 0.91 0.72 0.86 -0.18 -0.00 0.76
3 0.86 0.48 0.75 -0.02 -0.20 0.64
4 0.81 0.26 0.65 0.37 -0.26 0.55
5 0.74 0.08 0.58 0.04 -0.23 0.49
nt nt nt Ht Ht Ht
1 0.93 0.82 0.96 0.91 0.99 0.99
2 0.84 0.53 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.98
3 0.73 0.24 0.8 0.84 0.91 0.95
4 0.62 0.03 0.73 0.80 0.85 0.93
5 0.51 -0.1 0.68 0.76 0.8 0.90
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Order of Autocorrelation Data NCM NG Data NCM NG
g g g I=Y I=Y I=Y
1 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95
2 0.92 0.72 0.86 0.91 0.78 0.85
3 0.88 0.48 0.75 0.87 0.58 0.73
4 0.83 0.26 0.65 0.82 0.37 0.62
5 0.78 0.08 0.58 0.75 0.19 0.54
8 Simulation Results
We can now turn towards discussing the results of some simulations. In discussing
the results we will focus on the dynamics of employment and the NAIRU, Ination,
marginal costs and the capital stock.
JLN Economy - Unemployment and NAIRU
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Figure 2
We will discuss the results from the JLN economy rst. Figure 3 plots the response
of actual unemployment (blue diamond) and the NAIRU (the pink square). In all
gures, the period zero value will be the steady state value of the respective variable.
Unemployment increases by about 3 percentage points on impact but starts recovering
after rising to 10.4 percentage points above its steady state value. It then quickly
recovers and in quarter 8 practically returns to its steady state value. Employment
would be expected to decrease because the cost push shock will increase ination
which will ultimately lead to an increase in ex ante real interest rates via the policy
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rule 33. As consumers and investors are forward looking, this causes a contraction
of aggregate demand on impact. Figure 2 plots the ination rate, which peaks in
quarter 1 at a value of 3.8% and then quickly declines back to zero.
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There is then some overshooting in employment, because after employment has
recovered, the e¤ective labour ratio ( Kt
ntTFPt
) has decreased as capital stock growth has
slowed down during the recession. The resulting increase in the marginal product of
capital increases capital stock growth above trend, which can be obtained from gure
4. This increases the demand for labour. The path of natural employment shows that
this overshooting can be accommodated without an acceleration in ination. Natural
employment increases in line with actual employment because the real wage declines
relative to total factor productivity during the recession (see (??)). The higher level
of employment does then imply higher real wage growth. However, the fact that
capital stock growth is above trend puts downward pressure on rkt which works to
lower marginal costs (see equation (49)) and thus counters the inationary e¤ect of
above trend real wage growth
.
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Baseline - Unemployment and NAIRU
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Baseline - Inflation
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Figure 6
We now turn towards the New Growth economy. Figure 5 plots unemployment
and the NAIRU for quarter zero to quarter 80. Unemployment increases by 5.7
percentage points on impact. This is a bit strong, however big on impact jumps are
common problem in forward looking models whose solution lies beyond the scope of
this paper. It is clear that the shock has far more persistent e¤ect on employment than
in the neoclassical model. After about 11 quarters (10 quarters after the end of the
shock), when employment is already overshooting in the JLN economy, only a bit more
than half of the on-impact loss in employment has vanished and employment is still
about 3.2 percentage points below its steady state value. What is more, employment
growth soon comes to a halt: quarterly increases are now in the order of magnitude
0.06 percentage points per quarter or less. As can be obtained from table 7, after
40 quarters, or 10 years unemployment is still about 1.7 percentage points above its
steady state value, while after 60 Quarters (15 years) the di¤erence is still about 1
percentage point. Furthermore, Figure 5 reveals that the persistent increase in actual
unemployment is matched by an increase in the NAIRU, as after six quarters, actual
unemployment rises above the NAIRU, which gradually increases during and after
the recession. A glance at Figure 6 shows that ination (after peaking in quarter 1
at a quarterly rate of about 3.3 percentage point) indeed stops declining at about the
same time actual unemployment falls below the NAIRU, as we would expect from
equation 55 and the denition of the NAIRU in this model.
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Table 7: Baseline -
Unemployment increase with respect to the steady state for selected
Quarters
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
3.1 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.3 1 0.7 0.5
We know from equation (51) that an increase in unemployment will reduce real
wage growth which would tend to lower marginal costs, so there must be a strong
countervailing force pushing marginal costs up in order to explain why ination stops
falling. Figure 7 shows that while real wage growth drops sharply, in quarter 2 the
growth rate of the capital stock falls by even more and remains considerably below
real wage growth for about 9 quarters, after which they are about equal. Slower
capital stock growth entails slower technological progress and thus slower growth of
labour productivity, which will tend to generate a higher trajectory of marginal cost
for a given level of real wage growth. In the New Growth model, the movement of real
wages relative to labour productivity for a given employment level is thus captured
by the evolution of the wage capital ratio. Therefore this variable matters a lot for
marginal cost, which is also borne out by equation (50). Figure 8, which plots the
deviations of marginal cost and the wage capital ratio from their steady state values
conrms that it is the movement of the real wage capital ratio which drives marginal
cost back up, as both move broadly in parallel.
By contrast, in the neoclassical model, the e¤ect of the capital stock on mar-
ginal costs is much weaker. The major determinant of marginal costs apart from
real wages, TFPt, grows exogenously no matter whether output and investment are
contracting or growing. Thus marginal costs or, to put it di¤erently, the permissi-
ble, non-inationary rate of real wage growth are much less a¤ected by changes to
the capital stock. Furthermore, the neoclassical model has an in-built stabilisation
mechanism for investment, because unlike in the New Growth economy the marginal
product of capital increases in the labour-capital ratio. This is not the case in the
New Growth economy, where at the economy wide level, the capital rental depends
on employment alone, as can be obtained from equation (49).
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Baseline - Real Wage Capital Ratio and Marginal Costs
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Turning back to the New Growth economy, the recovery of actual employment has
to slow down after about 6 quarters because unemployment arrives at a level beyond
which any reduction would cause ination to accelerate as it would push real wage
growth above the growth rate of the capital stock and thus push up marginal cost.
This would trigger interest rate increases via the policy rule. In fact this is already
happening as actual unemployment is falling below actual unemployment and ina-
tion starts to pick up. To put it di¤erently, the central bank does not have a reason
to boost employment by aggressively lowering interest because although ination is
somewhat below target, the output gap is closed as marginal cost equals its steady
state value. Figure 9 shows that the central bank stops lowering the real interest rate
38
(i.e. Et (it   t+1)) after 8 quarters, when it is 0.45 percentage points (about 0.56
percentage points at an annualised rate) below the steady state value, and begins to
tighten again. This is not very expansionary because the capital rental is depressed
and expected to remain so, too. Figure 10 summarises the benets from investing by
plotting the present discounted value of an additional unit of capital, qt (this meaning
of qt can be picked up from equation (43) ; where the relevant discount factor is the
stochastic discount factor of households  u
0(Ct+1 Habt)
u0(Ct Habt 1)). Tobins Q recovers quickly
after the shock has passed and reaches its steady state value of one after 5 quarters,
then exceeds its steady state level for . However, this is not su¢ ciently high to move
up the capital stock growth rate quickly because of the presence of investment ad-
justment costs: The investment rst order conditions (43) determine the investment
growth rate, which due to fast recovery of qt moves much closer to its steady state
value as well. However, the capital stock growth rate depends on the investment cap-
ital ratio, as can be seen from equation (46) ; which has declined during the recession
and the subsequent period of slow growth. Thus a faster recovery of capital stock
growth would require an investment growth rate exceeding the steady state, which
would have to be induced by a higher qt which in turn would require a lower real
interest rate.
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Baseline - Tobin's q
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.01
1.02
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Quarters
Baseline - Tobin's q
Figure 10
The speed of recovery is then governed by the relative growth rates of real wages
and the capital stock. From quarter 9 onwards, the capital stock grows very slightly
faster than real wages. This causes a slow decline in the wage-capital ratio, as can
be obtained from gure 8, and allows for a slow reduction in unemployment because
higher productivity growth implies rms can accommodate the increased real wage
growth associated with a tighter labour market without facing an increase in marginal
costs. This, in turn, again increases capital stock growth by increasing the marginal
product of capital.
Thus the disination engineered by the central bank, while clearly successful, has
come at a cost beyond a temporary reduction in employment: The unemployment
level consistent with constant ination, or cmct = 0; has increased. Just as found by
Ball, a successful disination during which the economy goes into a recession is fol-
lowed by an increase in the NAIRU. Furthermore, there is also a persistent slowdown
in labour productivity growth. It is easily shown that labour productivity growth
pt in the New Growth model can be written as pt =

nt 1 n ns
nt n ns
 
1 + Kt
Kt 1

  1:
Hence if quarterly employment changes are negligible, productivity growth is essen-
tially equal to capital stock growth, implying that, from about quarter 9 onwards,
quarterly labour productivity growth can be obtained from gure 6. At this point
it falls short of its steady state value by about 0.23% per quarter or 0.92% at an
annualised rate, while 40 quarters after the shock it is still about 0.11% lower than
in the steady state (0.44% at an annualised rate).
These results provoke the question how changes to the central banks reaction
function a¤ects the long-run paths of employment and ination. Intuition would
expect that a stronger weight on the output gap in the reaction function would lead
to a smaller decrease in employment not just in the short but also in the long run
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because investment would be squeezed less, implying a smaller decline in capital
stock growth which could accommodate higher of non-inationary employment after
the recovery from the recession. Therefore we increase the coe¢ cient on the output
gap,  Y ; to 5, leaving all other parameters the same. The corresponding evolution
of unemployment can be obtained from gure 11. Indeed unemployment not only
increases considerably less in the short run (in fact it decreases on impact), but after
40 quarters, it is still about 0.8 percentage point lower than in the Baseline case, as
can be obtained from table 8. Hence a less hawkish monetary policy has indeed very
long-lasting benign e¤ects on employment. Figure 12 shows that capital stock growth
declines less than in the baseline case and that its post-shock plateau value exceeds
the corresponding baseline value ( in quarter 9) by about 0.05%, or about 0.2% at an
annualised rate, and also recovers faster subsequently.
Table 8:  Y = 5 - percentage point deviation of unemployment from
its Steady State for selected Quarters
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
1.8 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.29
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Output Gap Weight=5: Inflation
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Output Gap Weight=5 Capital Stock Growth and Real Wage
Growth
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The lower increase in unemployment comes at the cost of a considerably stronger
ination surge during the lifetime of the cost-push shock. While in the baseline sim-
ulation, ination peaks a (quarterly) rate of 3.3%, it now increases as high as 5.1%
in the rst quarter, as can be obtained from gure 12, while the annual ination
rate over the rst year amounts to 15%. Note however that the increase in ination
is only temporary. After 10 quarters, it has already decreased to 0.42%. Thus the
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stronger acceleration in ination is a short run phenomenon, while the gain in em-
ployment is of more long-run nature. Whether this is desirable or not would require
a welfare analysis which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is illustra-
tive to summarise the long-run trade-o¤s policymakers are facing by continuing to
vary the output gap coe¢ cient and to plot the resulting average annualised ination
rates against the corresponding average unemployment and natural unemployment
rates. This done in Figure 14 over 60 quarters, for values of  Y between 0.3 and
5. Both curves are clearly downward sloping. As with traditional Phillips Curves,
both curves become steeper as unemployment becomes lower. The unemployment
Phillips Curve is always atter than the NAIRU-Phillips Curve because monetary
policy a¤ects the path of actual unemployment in the short run more strongly than
the NAIRU: its slope varies from -0.77 to -2.7 as unemployment falls while the slope
of the NAIRU Phillips curve varies from -0.9 to -3.3. Over the range of policy rules
considered here, a 1.5 percentage point reduction in the average NAIRU is associated
with a 2.4 percentage point increase in ination. Hence we have, very much con-
tracting conventional wisdom, a trade-o¤ between ination and unemployment over
an extended period of time. By contrast, similar experiments with the neoclassical
version only produced the short run trade-o¤ between the variation of ination and
the variation of employment familiar from New Keynesian models. From an empiri-
cal point of view, 5 is arguably not a reasonable value for  Y ; however we will see in
the next section when we turn to the cross country dimension that the e¤ect of an
increase in the output gap coe¢ cient depends very much on the form of the policy
reaction function. We will use the estimates of Clarida Gali and Gertler (1998) of
the policy rule mentioned above for the Bundesbank and the Fed to explore to which
the estimated di¤erences in the reaction function coe¢ cients can help to explain the
di¤erence in the evolution of unemployment.
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Phillips Curves: 60 Quarter Averages of Inflation, NAIRU and
Unemployment for different Output Weights
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We will next consider how these results change if real wages are less exible.
Intuition would suggest that more exible wages would cause a less persistent response
of unemployment, because any given increase in unemployment leads to a smaller
reduction in real wage growth than before, which will mitigate the drop of the capital
stock growth rate relative to the real wage growth rate. Hence only a higher rate of
unemployment can be accommodated without triggering an acceleration of ination.
Higher unemployment in turn reduces the marginal product of capital, implying less
investment, reducing capital stock growth and thus limiting the room for employment
expansion.
To investigate the quantitative implications of these mechanisms, we reduce e
the slope of the real wage growth function b to 0.07. Figure 15 shows that both
actual unemployment and the NAIRU fall much slower than in the baseline case.
The maximum NAIRU is about 0.6 percentage points higher than the maximum in
the baseline simulation, thus reducing the room for an immediate non-inationary
recovery. As a result, after 40 quarters, as can be obtained from table 9 the deviation
from the steady state is 2.5 percentage points as opposed to 1.7 percentage points
in the baseline case. Viewing this and the previous results in conjunction clearly
lend support to the view that as suggested by Blanchard, it is both "shocks and
institutions" which are at the heart of explaining the evolution of unemployment, to
the extent that labour market institutions a¤ect real wage exibility. To the extent
that real wage growth is found to be more exible in the United States than in
continental Europe, this results o¤ers an explanation why the increase in American
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unemployment during the disination in the early 1980s has not been sustained.
However, as mentioned above, it seems that a robust observable intercontinental
di¤erence in real wage rigidity lies in the value of c; the coe¢ cient on the labour
share, rather than in the value of b:62 We will examine the consequences of setting c
equal to zero in the following section
Table 9: b = 0:06 - Percentage point Deviation of unemployment from
its Steady State for selected Quarters
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
3.6 3.4 2.9 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.2
b=0.07 - Unemployment and NAIRU
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As a nal robustness experiment, we change the slope of the adjustment cost
function by reducing : It is clear and can also be veried from equation (43) that
if adjustment cost react slower to It
It 1
, investment will be less a¤ected by changes
in the present value of an additional unit of capital and thus will decrease more in
response to a fall in qt and an increase in the real interest rate, which in turn implies
that reductions in employment will have a bigger e¤ect on capital accumulation, too.
This would be expected to increase unemployment in the short as well as in the
long run. On the other hand, lower adjustment costs also imply that investment
growth will by more when interest rates fall and employment recovers. This would
be expected to speed up the recovery of employment. Reducing  from 0.65 to 0.4
generates the employment path displayed in gure 16. As expected, both actual
and natural employment decrease by less than in the baseline case and recover more
quickly. Accordingly, unemployment increases by more both in the short and in the
medium run, as can be obtained from table 10.
62See Blanchard and Katz (1999), p.73, and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p.484-486.
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Table 10:  = 0:4 - Percentage point Deviation of unemployment from
its Steady State for selected Quarters
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
3.8 3.2 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6
gamma=0.4 - Unemployment and NAIRU
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Quarters
Unemployment
NAIRU
Figure 16
9 Cross Country Aspects
The previous section showed that our New Keynesian model with endogenous growth
is able to produce a persistent increase in unemployment as a consequence of a dis-
ination. This is an important result because economists have been struggling to
explain the evolution of unemployment in continental Europe over time. This begs
the question whether we can use our model also to (coarsely) replicate di¤erences in
unemployment evolutions across countries. We address this issue in three di¤erent
ways in this section. We take a look at di¤erences in the size of the disination across
the OECD, the policy reaction function coe¢ cients between the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve and real wage rigidity.
We have mentioned before that there is an apparent, if not perfect, negative
correlation between the change in ination and the change in the NAIRU. Ball (1996)
investigated this for the 1980s and we plotted it earlier over to decades and across 21
OECD countries. We will now vary the size of the disination over 10 years, or 40
quarters, in the most simple fashion, namely by varying the size of the cost push shock.
Cross country di¤erences in the size of the cost push shock used in our model can be
interpreted as di¤erences in the responsiveness to global supply shocks (for instance
di¤erences in the dependence on oil in case of an oil price shock), di¤erences in the
past record of monetary policy (in the sense that, some central banks have let ination
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spiral more out of bounds than others, leading to larger deviations of ination from
target), di¤erences in the choice of how much to disinate (a central bank might just
be willing to accept a higher ination rate) and di¤erently sized exchange rate shocks,
or some combination of all of these factors. We are being deliberately unspecic about
what exactly creates the di¤erence between the ination target of the central bank
and the actual ination rate. To generate observations, we vary the size of the cost
push shock from 0.01 to 0.05, leaving all other parameters unchanged, and calculate
the change from year 1 to year 10 of the ination rate during those years and the
NAIRU during the rst quarter of those years, and plot the later against the former
in gure 17.63 There is obviously a clear negative correlation. The slope of the line
varies between -0.41 and -0.56, which not too far away from the simple regression
coe¢ cient of -0.33 (or -0.36 if like Ball we do not consider Greece) resulting from a
regression of the change in the NAIRU on the change in ination using the OECD
data presented earlier.
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Let us now take a look at the e¤ect of empirical di¤erences in the Policy rule. To
get a proper idea of the e¤ects of these it is obviously important to have comparable
estimates. Therefore we make use of the fact that Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
estimated the same policy rule using the same methodology for several countries,
including Germany and the United States. We would have liked to draw on real
time estimates for the reasons given above but to our knowledge, internationally
comparable estimates of this kind do not exist. The coe¢ cient estimates of Clarida,
63We take the di¤erence of the rst quarter of both years since the NAIRU moves up very fast
during the rst four quarters. Di¤erencing the annual averages of the two years would create a
misleading impression of the correlation between the medium run change in the NAIRU (by unduly
reducing this change) and the change in ination. The quarterly movements of the NAIRU in the
OECD data are very slow and redoing gure one with the di¤erence in the NAIRU between 1980
quarter1 1990 quarter 1 rather than with the di¤erences in the annual averages as is the case now
would not change the result.
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Gali and Gertler of equation (57) for the Federal Reserve are reproduced in table 11.
We now repeat the same experiment we conducted in the last section for both the
estimates for the Bundesbank reaction function and the coe¢ cients of the Federal
Reserve. The rst two lines of Table 10 shows the deviation of unemployment from
is steady state for both set of coe¢ cients. Note rst that the persistent increase
in unemployment with the policy rule as specied and estimated by Clarida Gali,
and Gertler for the Bundesbank is substantially higher than the increase we saw
with the policy rule used in the Baseline. This illustrates that, in terms of the
unemployment e¤ects which are the subject of this paper, we were quite conservative
in specifying and calibrating and estimating our Baseline policy rule. Apart from
that, unemployment is persistently higher under the Bundesbank rule than under
the Federal reserve one, though the di¤erence is for the most part less than one
percentage point. For instance after 40 quarters, or 10 years, unemployment and
the NAIRU are about 0.7 percentage points higher under the Bundesbank Rule than
under the Federal Reserve rule. It is, however, informative to have a look at the
standard errors associated with Clarida, Gali and Gertlers estimate. For instance,
the standard error associated with the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate  has
as standard error of 0.03. Thus a value for  of 0.06 is still consistent (at a 5%
level of condence) with Clarida, Gali and Gertlers estimate. The third row of table
11 shows the implied evolution of unemployment if we set  = 0:91: The resulting
unemployment trajectory is substantially lower than with the point estimate. After
40 quarters, the unemployment and the NAIRU are now 1.3 percentage points lower
than under the Bundesbank rule, while after 50 quarters, the di¤erence is still 1
percentage point. In the same manner, we can also make use of the standard error of
the estimate of  Y , which equals 0.16. Increasing  Y to 0.88 yields the employment
trajectory shown in the nal row of Table 11, which is again lower than with the
point estimate: after 40 quarters, unemployment is and the NAIRU are about 1.3
percentage points lower than under the Bundesbank policy rule. Thus in the New
Growth model, di¤erences in policy function parameters consistent with the Clarida
Gali and Gertler evidence can contribute to explaining the di¤erent evolutions of the
unemployment rate in Germany as compared to the United States.
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Table 10: Coe¢ cient estimates of Clarida, Gali and Gertler for the
Federal Reserve.64
   Y 
1.83 0.56 0.97
Table 11: Clarida, Gali and Gertler policy rule: Deviation of unem-
ployment from its Steady State
Quarter 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Bundesbank 4.2 4.1 3.2 2.6 2.0 1.6 1.2 0.9
Federal Reserve 3.0 3.1 2.5 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.6
Federal Reserve,  = 0:91 2.2 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4
Federal Reserve,  Y = 0:88 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.5
Finally, we explore the e¤ects of the observed cross continental di¤erences in
the nature of real wage rigidity, namely the impact of the labour share term in the
wage setting function. Estimating (51) on U.S. data conrms the nding of other
researchers that c = 0; while the U.S. estimate of b is not signicantly di¤erent from
the value we employed so far (0.08). Therefore, in our nal experiment aimed at high-
lighting cross country dimensions, we set c = 0 in the Baseline calibration, leaving
everything else as in the Baseline, including the policy rule and its calibration. The
resulting deviation of unemployment from its steady state can be obtained from table
12. Clearly, the increase in unemployment is persistently lower: After 40 quarters,
unemployment is only 0.6 percentage points higher than in the steady state as com-
pared to 1.7 percentage points in the Baseline. Thus, to the extent that the presence
of the labour share term is due to institutional characteristics of the German labour
market not explicitly modelled in this paper, our result is in line with Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) nding that both shocks and institutions a¤ect unemployment in the
medium run.
The di¤erences in reaction function coe¢ cients and the di¤erences in real rigidity
examined here also contribute to explaining why some points in gure 14 are "o¤
the regression line". The three coe¢ cient vectors for the federal reserve investigated
here all imply lower NAIRU increases than under the Bundesbank rule but larger
disinations for an equally sized cost push shock, as can be obtained from the rst
four rows of table 13. Similarly, if we remove the labour share term from the wage
setting function in the baseline calibration, the increase in the NAIRU drops but the
size of the disination over ten years does not.
64See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), p. 1045.
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Table 12: c = 0 - Percentage point Deviation of unemployment from its
Steady State for selected Quarters
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.9 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Table 13: Change in the NAIRU vs. change in ination for various scenarios
annualt NAIRU
CGG, Bundesbank -0.6 2.50
CGG, Federal Reserve -3 1.9
CGG, Federal Reserve,  = 0:91 -9.1 1.2
CGG, Federal Reserve,  Y = 0:88 -6.3 1.4
Baseline, c = 0 -5.2 0.5
10 Conclusion
This paper is a rst pass at overcoming the traditional separation between the short
and the long run in modern macroeconomics by integrating a New Growth production
technology into a New Keynesian model with unemployment. We rst incorporate
a model embodying consensus features with respect to the short and medium run
e¤ect of a disination on unemployment. We then incorporate endogenous growth in
this model. We show that within such a framework, what is commonly referred to
as the natural rate of unemployment, or the NAIRU, is a¤ected by the interaction of
a one quarter cost push shock and monetary policy over a relevant horizon. Within
this framework shows a temporary, two year inationary shock ("cost push shock"),
combined with an interest rate rule of the central bank calibrated to an estimate
of a Bundesbank reaction function, can cause substantial and very persistent e¤ects
on unemployment, without any changes to labour market institutions. Under the
baseline calibration, unemployment will still be about 1.7 percentage points above
its pre-shock value after about 40 quarters, or 10 years. At the same time, ination
stops declining soon after the cost push shock has vanished. Thus the increase in
unemployment represents an increase in the NAIRU.
The increase in the NAIRU is brought about by the decline in investment during
the recession required to disinate the economy. The capital stock, in this endoge-
nous growth economy, has a much stronger e¤ect on marginal costs than in models
with a neoclassical production function. Thus, although wage growth declines as em-
ployment contracts, marginal cost returns back to their steady state level soon after
the shock has vanished, which stops the disination. The subsequent recovery is very
slow because the central bank has no reason to lower interest rates. Its reaction func-
tion dictates that it reacts solely to ination, which is constant, and the output gap,
dened as the deviation of output from the level consistent with constant ination,
which is zero.
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The model also shows that the central bank faces a trade-o¤between preventing a
strong acceleration of ination and quickly bringing ination back to target on the one
hand and preventing a persistent increase in unemployment on the other. A higher
coe¢ cient on the output gap has substantial and lasting benign e¤ects on the path of
employment. We also show that varying the output gap coe¢ cient and plotting the
resulting average unemployment rates and NAIRUs against the associated average
ination rates creates a downward sloping Phillips Curves.
Apart from generating a persistent increase in unemployment, the to some extent
the model proposed here can also replicate cross country di¤erences. Varying the size
of the cost push shock generates a relationship between the change in the ination
rate and the change in the NAIRU over a ten year horizon similar to the relationship
observed in the data. Using policy rule estimates of Clarida, Gali and Gertler for
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserves suggests a reason for the di¤erences in
unemployment performance in these countries. Finally, taking account of a well
established cross-continental di¤erence in the structure of the wage setting function,
namely the absence of a labour share term if the function is estimated for U.S. data,
helps with that as well: Lower real wage rigidity generates a lower increase in the
NAIRU. Thus the paper lends support to the view that, as suggested by Blanchard,
it is both "shocks and institutions" which are at the heart of explaining the evolution
of unemployment across time and the observed di¤erences across countries.
In addition, a comparison of second moments of the model with German data
ranging from 1970 to 1990 shows that the New Growth sticky price model is matching
the data of that time period much better than a sticky price model with an identical
calibration but with a standard neoclassical production function. In particular, the
New Growth sticky price model is much better at matching the observed persistence
in important macroeconomic variables like employment, output and consumption,
and other second moments as well.
Thus the model can contribute to explaining the evolution of European unem-
ployment during the 1980s and beyond. Rising NAIRUs would be the consequence of
the disinations engineered as a response to the inationary shocks of the late 1970s,
as would be part of the slowdown in productivity growth. It would also explain why,
as found by Ball, countries which disinated less and pursued a more expansionary
monetary policy once the economy was on the disinationary track like the United
States experienced smaller or no increases in the NAIRU. To the extent that real
wages are more exible in the United States, this would contribute to reducing the
increase in the NAIRU as well.
An obvious extension of the analysis presented here would be to introduce a
government and non Ricardian consumers or distortionary taxation to allow for ex-
pansionary e¤ects of debt-nanced government expenditure. While disination was
somewhat less an issue in Europe during the 1990s than during the 80s, the "road
towards Maastricht" forced those EU countries aiming to adopt the Euro in 1998
to pursue an austere scal policy which entailed both reducing budget decits and
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the public debt-GDP ratio. By contrast, the Reagan administration hugely increased
public debt. While this policy is commonly accepted to have a¤ected employment
in the short run, it would be interesting to analyse their potential long run e¤ects
within a suitably modied version of the model proposed here.
11 Appendix A - Forward Solution of the Phillips
curve
The Hybrid Phillips Curve of this model is
t =
t 1
1 + 
+
(   1)cmct
' (1 + )
+

1 + 
Ett+1 + ut
This can be rearranged to get
t   t 1 = (   1)cmct
'
+ (1 + )ut +  (Ett+1   t)
Dening t   t 1  St; we have a forward looking rst order di¤erence equation.
Using the forward operator F , which is dened such that FXt = Xt+1 we can write
(1  F )St = (   1)cmct
'
+ (1 + )ut
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Using the fact that Xt
1 F =
1X
i=0
 
iXt+i

if  < 1; we arrive at
t   t 1 =    1
'
1X
i=0
(cmct+i) + (1 + ) 1X
i=0
ut+i
12 Appendix B - Normalised Version of the Model
In this appendix we show how the normalisation of Ct; Yt; It and wt by the capital
stock change the aggregate equations of the model. The resulting equations are those
which have been simulated. We dene Ct
Kt
; habt 1
Kt
Yt
Kt
; It
Kt
and wt
Kt
as Dt; Habt 1; Ft; Rt
and Ht; while the gross capital stock growth rate
Kt+1
Kt
is dened as 1 + gkt+1:
65See Leslie (1993), pp.94-95.
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12.1 Aggregate demand
We directly apply the normalisation to the equations of the aggregate demand block:
Ft = Dt +Rt +
'
2
(t   t 1)2Ft (58)
Consumption
1= (Dt  Habt 1) = Et

(1 + it) =
 
(1 + t+1)Dt+1
 
1 + gkt+1

(59)
Habt 1 = j
Dt
1 + gKt+1
(60)
Investment:
Et
 
1
(Dt+1  Habt)
 
1 + gKt+1
  rkt+1 + qt+1 (1  )
!
=
1
Dt  Habt 1 q t(61)
1
Dt  Habt 1 qt
" 
1  
2

Rt
Rt 1
 
1 + gKt
  (1 + g)2!  Rt
Rt 1


Rt
Rt 1
 
1 + gKt
  (1 + g)# (62)
+Et
"
1
Dt+1  Habt qt+1

Rt+1
Rt
 
1 + gKt+1
2


Rt+1
Rt
 
1 + gKt+1
  (1 + g)# = 1
Dt  Habt 1 (63)
gKt+1 =   +Rt
"
1  
2

Rt
Rt 1
 
1 + gKt
  (1 + g)2# (64)
The rental on capital:
rkt = mctAt((nt   ns   n)1)1  (65)
12.2 Aggregate supply
Multiplying (49) K

1 
t
K

1 
t
mct =
F

1 
t Ht
X
(66)
where X = A
1
1  (1  )1.
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Wage Setting: lnwt = lnwt 1 + a + b (nt   n) + c log

wt 1(nt 1 n ns)
Yt 1

can be
rewritten as lnHt = a + b (nt   n) +

wt 1
Kt 1(1+gkt )

+ c log ((1  )mct 1) = a +
b (nt   n) + ln

Ht 1
(1+gkt )

+ c log ((1  )mct 1)
Ht = exp(a+ b (nt   n)) Ht 1 
1 + gkt
 ((1  )mct 1)c (67)
Employment: from Yt = AtKt((nt   n  ns)1)1 ; we have
nt =
1
1A
1
1 
t
F
1
1 
t + n+ n
s (68)
The Phillips Curve and the Policy rule do not contain any trended variables and
therefore does not need to be normalised. However, we will substitute the real prots
stochastic discount factor by its denition, i.e. t;t+1 = 
u0(Ct+1 Habt)
u0(Habt 1)
=  Ct Habt 1
Ct+1 Habt ;
which gives
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

+ 
'
2
(

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2
(69)
+
Dt  Habt 1
Ft
'Et

Ft+1
Dt+1  Habt

Pt+1
Pt
 

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

Pt+1
Pt

= 0 (70)
Replacing Pt+i
Pt 1+i
= 1 + t+i gives
(1  ) + mct   ' ((t   ut)  t 1) (1 + t   ut) + '
2
((t   ut)  t 1)2 (71)
+
Dt  Habt 1
Ft
'Et

Ft+1
Dt+1  Habt (t+1   (t   ut)) (1 + t+1)

= 0 (72)
Natural output in the two equations determining natural employment and natural
output has to be normalised as well. F nt , and "natural" employment nnt;
 1 =
(F nt )

1  exp(a+ b (nnt   n)) Ht 1(1+gkt )
Xt
(73)
F nt = At((n
n
t   n  ns)1)1 
given last periods wage/ capital ratio Ht 1 and this periods capital stock growth rate
rate gkt (which was also determined in the t-1 by the then investment decision). As
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can be obtained from the equations, both nFt and natural employment can change
over time. In particular, an increase in gkt will increase natural employment and nFt
, as it is no possible for rms to accommodate stronger real wage increases. The
output gap gpt is then calculated as
gpt =
Yt   Y nt
Y nt

Kt
Kt

=
Ft   F nt
F nt
(74)
13 Appendix C: Steady State Relations
This Appendix shows how to calculate the steady state values for the system devel-
oped in Appendix B. We will rst derive a steady state relation between the level of
employment and the steady state growth rate for the New Growth Economy
First we make use of the properties of the adjustment cost function and its deriv-
atives in the steady state and apply these to the third of the equations in (43) ; which
yields q = 1:We plug this into the second equation of (43), use log utility assumption
and notice that in the steady state all trended variables (including the level of habit
and consumption) grow at the same rate g to get

 
rkt+1 + (1  )

= (1 + g) (75)
In the New Growth economy, we now replace the capital rental with equation (48),
noting that in the steady state we have mc =  1; to arrive at
g =



(1  ) +  1A((n  n  ns)1)1 
  1
Clearly, g is increasing in n.
This is the steady state growth rate which is borne out by the marginal product
of capital in the endogenous growth economy. It is easily veried that it is concave in
employment. It is straightforward to show that the real wage implied by the desired
mark-up grows at the same rate as output and the capital stock by using mct =  1
on 50. This yields
wt = Kt1

 1A(1  )1 
(rk)
1=(1 )
(76)
 lnwt =  lnKt = g (77)
Hence in the steady state, the real wage has to grow at the same rate as the capital
stock. This means that equation 76 is in e¤ect the dynamic, endogenous growth
version of the familiar macroeconomic textbook price setting function: It gives the
real wage growth rate compatible with marginal costs remaining constant and at its
long run level. Unlike the textbook price setting function, this real wage growth
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rate is not constant but increases in employment: A higher steady state employment
level implies a higher marginal product of capital, which triggers higher investment
and thus faster capital stock- and thus productivity growth. Accordingly, the steady
state levels of employment an the growth rate are determined by the intersection of
76 with the wage setting function 19, making againg use of the fact that mc =  1:
In practice, as was mentioned above, we choose a desired steady state employment
rate (here 0.96) and then compute the wage setting function intercept a to support
this value, given g, b and  and n:
Having determined g and n; the determination of the steady state values of
Ft; Dt; Rt; Ht; r
k
t and it is now straightforward. For F we have
F = A((n  n  ns)1)1  (78)
from the production function. ForRt; we have from the capital accumulation equation
in (43)
R = g +  (79)
D can then be determined as a residual via
D = F  R (80)
H is computed using the cost-minimisation rst order condition for labour (15)
H = (1  ) 1 F
n  n  ns (81)
rk is computed via
rk =  1A((n  n  ns)1)1  (82)
The steady state value of it is computed from 42 (noting that in the steady state we
have zero ination and that both habit and consumption grow at the steady state
growth rate)
i =
1 + g

  1 (83)
Note that this is also the intercept of the interest rate rule i of the central bank.
14 Appendix D: Normalised Version of the Neo-
classical Model
Most of the equations from Appendix B just carry over to the neoclassical model.
However, there are a few changes related to the production function and the marginal
cost equation. The aggregate production function is now Yt = AKt (TFPt1 (nt   n  ns))1  :
Dividing both sides by Kt gives
Ft = (lt1 (nt   n  ns))1  (84)
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where lt is dened as TFPtKt . This variable evolves according to
lt =
1 + gTFP
1 + gKt
lt 1 (85)
In the neoclassical model, it convenient to normalise the real wage with respect to
TFPt rather than with respect to Kt, while all the remaining normalisations carry
over to the neoclassical model. Denoting wt
TFPt
as Hnct ; we have from (49) ; after
making use of (47)
mct =
F
(=(1 ))
t H
nc
t
A1=(1 ) (1  )1
(86)
Concerning the capital rental, we employ the neoclassical expression for Ft to have
rkt = mctAl
1 
t ((nt   n  ns)1)1  (87)
Finally, the normalised wage setting becomes
Hnct = exp(a+ b (nt   n))
Hnct 1
(1 + gTFP )
((1  )mct 1)c (88)
All the remaining equations are just the same as in the New Growth version. The
computation of the steady state values in the neoclassical model is slightly di¤erent.
The steady state growth rate (of output, consumption, the capital stock, the real
wage) is now given by the parameter gTFP rather than being endogenously deter-
mined, which means we have g = gTFP : Hence we can compute the steady state real
interest rate from 83, while we compute rk from 75. From 88, we have the steady
state employment rate. Setting mct =  1in 87 then gives the steady state value for
lt as
l =
1
(nt   n  ns)1

rk
A
1=(1 )
(89)
which allows us to compute F from 84. Rearranging 86 then gives Hnc:
15 Appendix E: Estimation of the Wage Setting
Function
We estimate the real wage growth function using German data ranging from 1970Q1
to 2000Q4. Our dataset includes Western German data up to 1991Q4 and from then
on data for the unied country. All data is taken from a publication of the Ger-
man "Statistisches Bundesamt", all of which has been seasonally adjusted.66 When
66See Statistisches Bundesamt (2006) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2007a).
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estimating the function, we replace the employment rate with one minus the unem-
ployment rate. As a measure for labour costs, we the "Arbeitnehmerentgeld" per hour
worked, which is employee compensation including the full tax wedge. This is deated
using the GDP price index. To construct the labour share we use We then estimate
 logwt = a+ b Unemploymentratet+ c log (LSt 1) + d92Q1; where LSt 1 denotes
the previous periods labour share in GDP, that means total nominal compensation
(i.e. total "Arbeitnehmerentgeld") divided by total nominal GDP. d92Q1 denotes
an intercept dummy equalling one in 1992Q1 and zero everywhere else. The later is
again to account for reunication. We tried a slope dummy as well but it was not
signicant. We use two stage least squares to account for the possible endogeneity
of employment. As instruments, we choose  log realwaget 1; unemploymentratet 1
(following again Danthine/Kurman (2004)); c and d92Q1:67
As was already mentioned above, we exclude the period from 1970q1 to 1974Q4
because this was a time of extreme union militancy. During this period, there are ve
observations for real wage growth exceeding 2%, which are much higher than in the
remainder of the sample. Fit (as measured by the adjusted R2) strongly improves
when we exclude those observations, and the result also becomes more e¢ cient as the
standard error strongly decreases. Note that we use Newey-West Standard Errors
serial correlation consistent standard errors because the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for
serial correlation rejects the hypotheses of no serial correlation at the 5% level. The
result is reported in table E1, where WG denotes the change in log real wages, U
denotes the unemployment rate.
67See Danthine/ Kurman (2004), p. 121.
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Table E1
Dependent Variable: WG
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Date: 06/03/08 Time: 12:27
Sample (adjusted): 1970Q3 2000Q4
Included observations: 122 after adjustments
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4)
Instrument list: WG(-1) C U(-1) LOG(LS(-2)) D92Q1
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.042273 0.018893 -2.237531 0.0271
U -0.120587 0.046582 -2.588689 0.0108
LOG(LS(-1)) -0.089599 0.032530 -2.754342 0.0068
D92Q1 -0.112300 0.002188 -51.33630 0.0000
R-squared 0.574362 Mean dependent var 0.005890
Adjusted R-squared 0.563541 S.D. dependent var 0.014077
S.E. of regression 0.009300 Sum squared resid 0.010205
F-statistic 52.46032 Durbin-Watson stat 2.535359
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Note that our calibrated value of b is lower than the point estimate of 0.12. Note
that this not statistically di¤erent from 0.12 with any reasonable level of condence,
in fact it is less than one standard deviation away from the point estimate The reason
for this choice is that while it is possible to preserve the results of this paper in face
of higher wage exibility, this calibration has certain undesirable features. If we aim
to achieve a steady growth rate of GDP in the order of magnitude of a reasonable
order of magnitude (and one that makes lifetime utility converge), we would have to
choose either relatively high depreciation rates or a lower individual discount factor,
implying a very high steady state risk less rate. Furthermore, a reduction in hours
worked, which is the variable in the model is in reality not reected one for one in
an increase in unemployment. Regressing unemployment on log hours for the time
period of 1970 to 1991q4 yields a coe¢ cient of around 0.5. However, using detrended
logarithmised hours to estimate the wage setting function does not yield signicant
results. We think that these considerations justify the choice of a value smaller than
the point estimate.
The reason why the coe¢ cient of the labour share c falls short of the calibrated
coe¢ cient is due to the fact that we have experimented with di¤erent computations
of the labour share in GDP, i.e. one based on nominal values, which is the one used in
the table and one based on real values. The later computations methods generated a
value slightly higher than the 0.1 we had used in the simulations. However robustness
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checks show that a reduction of c by 0.01 has only a small e¤ect and therefore we do
not feel it necessary to redo all simulations discussed in the paper.
For the United States, we estimate the wage setting equation using the BLS series
on real hourly compensation, BLS series PRS85006153, to calculate  logwt; the
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, series LNS14000000Q, nominal GDP from
the BEA NIPA table 1.1.5 and total nominal employee compensation from the BEA
NIPA table 2.1. In order to get a signicant coe¢ cient on the unemployment rate,
we were forced to include ve years more than in our estimate for Germany, and we
thus started in 1965. The result can be obtained from Table E2. As expected, the
LS is not signicant, which was result robust to adding and excluding observations.
Re estimating the equation after dropping log (LSt 1) leads to an almost unchanged
estimate of the coe¢ cient on the unemployment rate. Note that the coe¢ cients on
the unemployment rate in Germany is not statistically di¤erent from the coe¢ cient
estimated for the U.S. at any reasonable level of condence.
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Table E2
Dependent Variable: WG
Method: Least Squares
Date: 06/03/08 Time: 16:03
Sample: 1965Q1 2000Q4
Included observations: 144
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4)
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.005364 0.033562 0.159838 0.8732
U -0.066995 0.033021 -2.028888 0.0444
LS 0.003206 0.059322 0.054043 0.9570
R-squared 0.030102 Mean dependent var 0.003202
Adjusted R-squared 0.016345 S.D. dependent var 0.006138
S.E. of regression 0.006088 Akaike info criterion -7.344412
Sum squared resid 0.005226 Schwarz criterion -7.282541
Log likelihood 531.7977 F-statistic 2.188064
Durbin-Watson stat 1.642216 Prob(F-statistic) 0.115927
Table 13
Dependent Variable: WG
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Date: 06/03/08 Time: 13:15
Sample: 1965Q1 2000Q4
Included observations: 144
Instrument list: WG(-1) C U(-1)
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
U -0.067605 0.032425 -2.084951 0.0389
C 0.007253 0.002008 3.612856 0.0004
R-squared 0.030069 Mean dependent var 0.003202
Adjusted R-squared 0.023238 S.D. dependent var 0.006138
S.E. of regression 0.006067 Sum squared resid 0.005226
F-statistic 4.347020 Durbin-Watson stat 1.643279
Prob(F-statistic) 0.038864
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16 Appendix F: Construction of the Dataset used
in the Moment Comparison
This appendix explains the construction of the dataset for Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht. The
German federal statistical o¢ ce ("Statistisches Bundesamt") supplies annual data
for the capital stock in constant prices of the year 2000.68 Thus we had to construct
quarterly observations for the capital stock. We decided on the following method.
We rst calculated the annual change. Than we allocated the total changed to the
four quarters according to the share these quarters had in real gross xed investment.
Our data on real output, consumption and investment expenditure was preferably
also to be in prices of 2000. However, the Statistisches Bundesamt only supplies
chained indices for these variables.69 We therefore used nominal GDP, consumption
and investment 2000 to recursively calculate our series in absolute numbers. As the
indices for post and pre reunication years have di¤erent bases, we used the ratio
of unied Germany to Western Germany from 1991 to downscale the index for each
variable. Furthermore, as the total labour force in our model is normalised to one,
Output, consumption and investment are essentially expressed in per capita terms in
our model. As a measure of the size of the labour force we use a linear trend which we
t to total hours. Our empirical measure of Ft is then given by output/(capital*trend
hours), and analogously for Dt and Rt: Ht is computed using the real wage data also
employed in the previous section (now expressed in prices of 2000).
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